1 hour 55 minutes
Hello, peoples of the Interwebs. This is tensed over and welcome to the next video on our comprehensive guide to the tour browser.
On this episode, we're getting into the weaknesses of the Tor browser and network.
My name is Tempest over again, and before we get much father into this course, let's look over these pre Rex
and have changed in their store aren't any. This is your first to do with me. Welcome aboard. I would recommend going back and watching the previous videos as they deal with a great set where we are now.
As you can read here. Basic networking is a plus, but not required. Also, basically, just having need. Andorra wants to be anonymous online, especially since I S. P s or service providers can log all your doing. And they will,
due to the fact we're in discussions now of the Deep Web, Dark Lab and Dark Net. I'm going to give you the proper schools, teach you how to use them and advise on how to safely navigate the deep Web dark Web dark.
But that said, this is not an endorsement of going there illegally at your place of work or home.
Nor, unfortunately, if anything should happen to you, your equipment or any other possessions is cyber or myself liable. Please be careful.
It depends. Tor browser is designed to minimize the chances of spying eavesdropping, but nothing is foolproof Nowadays. The Tor network also has its weaknesses, mostly present at its end points where the traffic leaves and network
when you use tour, the connection between you and the Tor network is encrypted, so your eyes p cannot eavesdrop. But when you access a normal http website with tour connection between the exit noted, the target website is unencrypted. That means the exit no can eavesdrop and manipulate the whole connection.
You don't know if exit node and its eyes P is trustworthy,
so this could be very dangerous.
This is not applied to hidden service is dot onion websites. In that case, the encryption is into end. Another http s layer is redundant and counterproductive because one purpose of https is to de anonymized the server.
Research undertaken between 8 4014 suggests that more than 81% tour clients can be done on a miser that originating i p addresses revealed by exploiting the Net love technology that Cisco has built a router protocols and similar traffic analysis software running by default
and the hardware of other manufacturers.
Net flow in basic terms is a service and Cisco product that allows for network traffic counting usage based network building planning etcetera.
Professor Chakrabarty has stated that one A s autonomous system could monitor more than 39% of randomly generated tour circuits.
A powerful yet non global adversary could use traffic analysis methods to determine the various relays participating in a tourist circuit and directly monitor the traffic entering the entry note of the victim's connection.
The heart bleed bug is a serious vulnerability in the popular open SSL Cryptographic Software Library. This week is allows stealing information protected under normal conditions by the S S L T L s encryption used to secure the Internet. SS lt l s provides communications, security and privacy over the Internet
provocation such a Web email, instant messaging and some virtual private networks.
The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory that was protected by the vulnerable versions of the open as a self software.
This compromise is the secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic names and passwords
of the users and the actual content. This allows the tigers eavesdrop on communications, steal data directly from the service's and users to impersonate surfaces and users.
The tour project recommended that tour really operators in hidden service operators revoked and generate fresh keys after patching open SSL, but noted that Tor Relays used two sets of keys and the tour's multi hop design minimizes the impact of exploiting single relay.
586 relays later found acceptable to the heart bleed but were taken off line as a precautionary measure.
One common problem that the Tor browser tries addresses user fingerprinting website is able to generate a unique fingerprint identifies each user that enters the page. Then it is possible to track activity of this user in time, for example, correlate visits or of the user during an entire year, knowing that's the same user.
In the past, a lot of finger printing methods have been used and proposed, and Tor browser has been updated with countermeasures.
Examples of that are reading. Text size is out of a canvas element. Screen dimensions, local time operating system information, etcetera.
One famous example of browser fingerprinting was canvas to your printing. As of today, almost everything that can be used identify the user has been disabled in Tor browser.
Candace Fingerprinting is one of a number of brother fingerprinting techniques for tracking online. Users that allow websites identify and track visitors using the HTML five Kansas element instead of bras or cookies or other similar means Mouse wheel bug and Tor browser. And most browsers
leaked information of the underlying hardware used to scroll
the Web page.
The event provides information about the Delta Scroll. However, if you're using a normal computer mouse with a mouse wheel, the deltas always three. But if using the trackpad, the deltas are variable and related to your track. Pad your usage patterns.
Another leak in the mouse wheel is a scroll speed that is leaked to the configuration of the operating system and the hardware capabilities itself.
Crazy, isn't it?