TL;DR
- Insider threats include malicious, negligent, and compromised-account activity which cause identity and data problems.
- High-performing programs blend cross-functional governance with targeted telemetry and explainable analytics, bounded by privacy guardrails.
- Start with prioritized use cases and minimally sufficient data; expand with playbooks, metrics, and continuous tuning.
- Leverage Microsoft 365/Google Workspace audit logs, identity signals, and data classification to do much of the early heavy lifting.
- Reduce repeated risky behavior without damaging culture with clear policies, coaching, and proportionate responses.
Insider threats are identity and data-driven risks that arise when trusted users, or attackers wield stolen credentials and misuse access. This guide explains what insider threats in cyber security are, how to spot them, and how to prevent and respond to them without eroding employee trust.
Ready to operationalize this? Pair this guide with our course: 8 Steps to Building a Modern Insider Threat Program
What Are Insider Threats in Cyber Security?
An insider threat occurs when a person with authorized access, or an attacker using valid but stolen credentials, causes harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems and data. “Insiders” can be employees, contractors, partners, service accounts, and even automations or bots configured with access.
Unlike external attacks, insider threats often leverage legitimate tools and normal channels (e.g., cloud storage, email forwarding, source control), which means context and identity signals matter more than signatures or IP reputation.
Types of Insider Threats (with Examples)
Business Impact and Risk Drivers
Insider threats in cyber security create cost across multiple dimensions: investigation and response time, operational disruption, legal exposure, and competitive loss. Risk is amplified by broad entitlements, shadow SaaS (any cloud app your employees use for work that the company hasn’t approved, doesn’t know about, or can’t centrally manage), weak offboarding, and exception sprawl. A practical first step is to define and label your “crown jewels” (the handful of data categories that, if leaked or altered, would materially harm the business).
Indicators to Watch: Behavioral and Technical Signals
Behavioral Precursors
- Upcoming termination or resignation; sudden role or team changes
- Repeated policy exception requests or access escalation attempts
- Expressed grievances, performance issues tied to high-risk access
Technical Signals
- Off-hours bulk downloads; spikes in file sharing or permission changes
- USB mass-storage events; attempts to disable DLP/EDR agents
- Creation of auto-forwarding rules; anomalous OAuth consent grants
These signals become meaningful when enriched with identity context (role, manager, employment type) and HR events (joiner, mover, leaver). That context helps triage what’s truly risky versus what’s routine.
Prevention and Detection: Controls That Actually Work
- Identity & Access: Least privilege, time-bound access, and privileged access management for admins.
- Data Controls: Classification/labels on sensitive data, DLP policies with safe-sharing defaults.
- Endpoint & SaaS Telemetry: EDR/DLP agents plus audit logs from Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Box, Slack, GitHub.
- Analytics: Start with explainable rules; add baselines or UEBA later. Favor clarity over opaque risk scores early on.
Building the Program: Governance, Policy, and Privacy
Insider risk is a business program. Establish a cross-functional council (Security, HR, Legal/Privacy, IT, and business leaders) with a clear charter and RACI (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed). Update acceptable use and monitoring notices to describe what’s collected and why, define retention windows, and implement role-based access to insider-risk data with dual-control for sensitive queries.
- Publish a proportionality rubric: what behaviors justify which monitoring and actions.
- Communicate proactively: what’s monitored, how privacy is protected, and how to report concerns.
Priority Use Cases to Implement First
How-To: Detecting Insider Threats in Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace
Where the Logs Live
- Microsoft 365: Unified Audit Log (Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive), Purview DLP, Defender for Cloud Apps.
- Google Workspace: Admin audit logs (Drive, Gmail), Context-Aware Access, DLP.
Policy Starters
- Label sensitive docs and apply DLP rules for external sharing and bulk download thresholds.
- Alert on creation of auto-forwarding rules and suspicious OAuth consent grants.
- Watch for sudden spikes in file exports by a single user or device.
Tuning Tips
- Whitelist sanctioned automations and backup processes to reduce noise.
- Use user and peer baselines to distinguish projects from exfil attempts.
- Join HR/IdP attributes to prioritize alerts with real risk context.
Response Playbooks: From Triage to Resolution
A good case doesn’t start with a verdict; it starts with a hypothesis. Triage is where you pressure-test that hypothesis. When an alert fires, say, a user exported 1.5 GB from OneDrive in the evening, your analyst’s first task is to validate the signal (is the telemetry trustworthy?) and pull lightweight context: who is the user, who’s their manager, what is their role, and are they a joiner/mover/leaver? In many environments, this first pass takes minutes if your case tool auto-enriches with HR/IdP attributes.
If the signal holds up, move to Enrichment. This is where you build a timeline: last seven days of file activity, recent DLP hits, whether a mailbox forwarding rule appeared, and whether any OAuth consents were granted to third-party apps. You’re answering, “What changed around the user?” (new repo access, a project deadline, a role change) so you can separate urgent risk from normal surge.
Only then are you ready for a Decision. The classification should be explainable: benign (documented business reason), policy violation (careless sharing), suspicious (pattern fits exfil but still ambiguous), or malicious (clear intent or concealment). A key discipline here is proportionality: the response should match the confidence and potential impact.
Actions should be pre-approved and tiered so analysts don’t debate every step. Low-impact outcomes include a coaching note and a quick policy refresher. Medium actions might add monitored access or temporarily block a specific DLP vector. High-severity cases move to device imaging, HR investigation, and legal hold, with dual-control and audit logging to prevent misuse.
Finally, Documentation is what makes your program defensible. Capture the alert, context, decisions, and actions in a system that preserves chain of custody. This is also your learning loop: every closed case should inform detection tuning and training content.
Operational targets: Aim for Mean Time to Triage (MTTT) under one business day for standard alerts, faster for high-risk categories (e.g., pending leavers). Keep Mean Time to Decision (MTTD) tied to severity: minutes for active exfil, hours for ambiguous behavior. Publish a simple escalation matrix so everyone knows when HR/Legal must be in the room.
Metrics That Prove Value
Dashboards matter when they change decisions, especially for insider threats in cyber security. Start with lead indicators that describe operational health: the percentage of top use cases that actually have complete telemetry; your alert precision (how many alerts became real cases); and analyst effort per case. If precision is low, you’re training your team to ignore the console; tune the rules or add context.
Pair those with lag indicators that show outcomes: time-to-contain confirmed exfiltration attempts, the reduction in repeat risky behaviors after coaching (the truest test of culture shaping), and incident rates in your most sensitive groups. If the time-to-contain is improving but incidents per 1,000 users are rising, you’ve got visibility without prevention and it’s time to tighten controls or training.
Make space for fairness reviews each quarter. Look for disproportional impact across departments or roles, and adjust either the detections (too sensitive for a particular workflow) or the policies and training (unclear rules driving “work-around” behavior). Close the loop by feeding post-incident insights into your detection library and manager enablement materials.
Industry Overviews
Healthcare (PHI). The hardest part isn’t catching obvious exports, it’s respecting clinical realities. EMR audit trails are rich, but busy clinicians will find the quickest path to share data with a referring physician. Reduce violations by making the right workflow the fastest one (pre-approved secure messaging) and by labeling PHI so DLP can distinguish a scanned lunch menu from a discharge summary. Least-privilege for clinical roles and regular rounding with nurse managers go further than one-off training.
Manufacturing (IP & CAD). Crown jewels are design files and process specs that often live across PLM, shared drives, and cloud storage. Shop-floor PCs may be shared and poorly patched; USB is still common. Classify CAD outputs at the source, enforce safe-sharing defaults with suppliers, and watch for unusual bulk exports when engineers change teams or give notice. For OT, aim for pragmatic separation and detective controls. Although perfect segmentation is rare, layered visibility is achievable.
Financial Services (Controls). Regulation shapes the program: data walls, surveillance, and retention are non-negotiable. Insider risk intersects with trade surveillance and e-comms monitoring, so define the seams: when does a case stay with Security, and when does it hand off to Compliance? Controls like pre-trade checks and supervised channels reduce temptation; your insider program focuses on privilege change, exception sprawl, and third-party access.
Common Myths and FAQs
Myths
“DLP alone solves insider threats.” DLP is necessary but not sufficient. It blocks known bad movements; it doesn’t understand why a movement is happening. Pair it with identity signals (role, manager, leaver status) and behavioral patterns (forwarding rules, OAuth grants) to find intent and reduce false positives.
“Monitoring violates privacy.” Secret monitoring erodes trust; transparent, proportionate monitoring builds it. Publish an acceptable-use and monitoring notice, minimize what you collect, restrict who can see it, and audit every sensitive query. When employees know the rules and the guardrails, they’re more likely to choose the safe path.
“We need every log.” You need the right logs joined with identity, not all logs. Most early wins come from Microsoft 365/Google Workspace audit trails, endpoint USB events, and HR/IdP feeds. Start there, then expand based on real incident patterns.
“Only admins are risky.” Admins can cause outsized damage, but many impactful incidents come from well-meaning staff or compromised non-privileged accounts. Your program should weight risk by context, not title.
Get Started: 30-Day Quick Launch Plan
Week 1 — Align and define. Convene Security, HR, Legal/Privacy, and IT. Approve a short charter, publish a clear monitoring notice, and select five high-value use cases (e.g., leaver-window exfil, forwarding rules, USB mass-writes, repo cloning, admin privilege spikes). Success this week is alignment, not tooling.
Weeks 2–3 — Wire the data. Connect HR/IdP feeds and core SaaS/endpoint logs. Test identity stitching so every alert resolves to a person, manager, and status. Stand up basic case management with auto-enrichment. Draft response playbooks with pre-approved actions and escalation paths.
Week 4 — Prove the loop. Turn on your first detections, tune based on noise, and run a one-hour tabletop to exercise the playbooks. Publish a short manager note explaining what’s monitored and how to ask for exceptions. Close the month with a tiny dashboard: precision, MTTT, and one story that shows value (e.g., a coached user who changed behavior).
Next Steps
Share this Insider Threats in Cyber Security guide with your HR, Legal/Privacy, and IT partners and book a 30-minute working session to pick your five starter use cases. Assign one owner to each, connect the data sources they require, and pick a launch date. Then commit to a monthly review where you tune detections, refresh training snippets, and retire anything that isn’t pulling its weight.
For even more information enroll in our 8 Steps to Building a Modern Insider Threat Program and learn how to better protect your organization, today.
The Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) is a community-led organization and has been around for over 20 years and is largely known for its Top 10 web application security risks (check out our course on it). As the use of generative AI and large language models (LLMs) has exploded recently, so too has the risk to privacy and security by these technologies. OWASP, leading the charge for security, has come out with its Top 10 for LLMs and Generative AI Apps this year. In this blog post we’ll explore the Top 10 risks and explore examples of each as well as how to prevent these risks.
LLM01: Prompt Injection
Those familiar with the OWASP Top 10 for web applications have seen the injection category before at the top of the list for many years. This is no exception with LLMs and ranks as number one. Prompt Injection can be a critical vulnerability in LLMs where an attacker manipulates the model through crafted inputs, leading it to execute unintended actions. This can result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or social engineering. There are two types: Direct Prompt Injection, which involves "jailbreaking" the system by altering or revealing underlying system prompts, giving an attacker access to backend systems or sensitive data, and Indirect Prompt Injection, where external inputs (like files or web content) are used to manipulate the LLM's behavior.
As an example, an attacker might upload a resume containing an indirect prompt injection, instructing an LLM-based hiring tool to favorably evaluate the resume. When an internal user runs the document through the LLM for summarization, the embedded prompt makes the LLM respond positively about the candidate’s suitability, regardless of the actual content.
How to prevent prompt injection:
- Limit LLM Access: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting the LLM's access to sensitive backend systems and enforcing API token controls for extended functionalities like plugins.
- Human Approval for Critical Actions: For high-risk operations, require human validation before executing, ensuring that the LLM's suggestions are not followed blindly.
- Separate External and User Content: Use frameworks like ChatML for OpenAI API calls to clearly differentiate between user prompts and untrusted external content, reducing the chance of unintentional action from mixed inputs.
- Monitor and Flag Untrusted Outputs: Regularly review LLM outputs and mark suspicious content, helping users to recognize potentially unreliable information.
LLM02: Insecure Output Handling
Insecure Output Handling occurs when the outputs generated by a LLM are not properly validated or sanitized before being used by other components in a system. Since LLMs can generate various types of content based on input prompts, failing to handle these outputs securely can introduce risks like cross-site scripting (XSS), server-side request forgery (SSRF), or even remote code execution (RCE). Unlike Overreliance (LLM09), which focuses on the accuracy of LLM outputs, Insecure Output Handling specifically addresses vulnerabilities in how these outputs are processed downstream.
As an example, there could be a web application that uses an LLM to summarize user-provided content and renders it back in a webpage. An attacker submits a prompt containing malicious JavaScript code. If the LLM’s output is displayed on the webpage without proper sanitization, the JavaScript will execute in the user’s browser, leading to XSS. Alternatively, if the LLM’s output is sent to a backend database or shell command, it could allow SQL injection or remote code execution if not properly validated.
How to prevent Insecure Output Handling:
- Zero-Trust Approach: Treat the LLM as an untrusted source, applying strict allow list validation and sanitization to all outputs it generates, especially before passing them to downstream systems or functions.
- Output Encoding: Encode LLM outputs before displaying them to end users, particularly when dealing with web content where XSS risks are prevalent.
- Adhere to Security Standards: Follow the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) guidelines, which provide strategies for input validation and sanitization to protect against code injection risks.
LLM03: Training Data Poisoning
Training Data Poisoning refers to the manipulation of the data used to train LLMs, introducing biases, backdoors, or vulnerabilities. This tampered data can degrade the model's effectiveness, introduce harmful biases, or create security flaws that malicious actors can exploit. Poisoned data could lead to inaccurate or inappropriate outputs, compromising user trust, harming brand reputation, and increasing security risks like downstream exploitation.
As an example, there could be a scenario where an LLM is trained on a dataset that has been tampered with by a malicious actor. The poisoned dataset includes subtly manipulated content, such as biased news articles or fabricated facts. When the model is deployed, it may output biased information or incorrect details based on the poisoned data. This not only degrades the model’s performance but can also mislead users, potentially harming the model’s credibility and the organization’s reputation.
How to prevent Training Data Poisoning:
- Data Validation and Vetting: Verify the sources of training data, especially when sourcing from third-party datasets. Conduct thorough checks on data integrity, and where possible, use trusted data sources.
- Machine Learning Bill of Materials (ML-BOM): Maintain an ML-BOM to track the provenance of training data and ensure that each source is legitimate and suitable for the model’s purpose.
- Sandboxing and Network Controls: Restrict access to external data sources and use network controls to prevent unintended data scraping during training. This helps ensure that only vetted data is used for training.
- Adversarial Robustness Techniques: Implement strategies like federated learning and statistical outlier detection to reduce the impact of poisoned data. Periodic testing and monitoring can identify unusual model behaviors that may indicate a poisoning attempt.
- Human Review and Auditing: Regularly audit model outputs and use a human-in-the-loop approach to validate outputs, especially for sensitive applications. This added layer of scrutiny can catch potential issues early.
LLM04: Model Denial of Service
Model Denial of Service (DoS) is a vulnerability in which an attacker deliberately consumes an excessive amount of computational resources by interacting with a LLM. This can result in degraded service quality, increased costs, or even system crashes. One emerging concern is manipulating the context window of the LLM, which refers to the maximum amount of text the model can process at once. This makes it possible to overwhelm the LLM by exceeding or exploiting this limit, leading to resource exhaustion.
As an example, an attacker may continuously flood the LLM with sequential inputs that each reach the upper limit of the model’s context window. This high-volume, resource-intensive traffic overloads the system, resulting in slower response times and even denial of service. As another example, if an LLM-based chatbot is inundated with a flood of recursive or exceptionally long prompts, it can strain computational resources, causing system crashes or significant delays for other users.
How to prevent Model Denial of Service:
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limits to restrict the number of requests from a single user or IP address within a specific timeframe. This reduces the chance of overwhelming the system with excessive traffic.
- Resource Allocation Caps: Set caps on resource usage per request to ensure that complex or high-resource requests do not consume excessive CPU or memory. This helps prevent resource exhaustion.
- Input Size Restrictions: Limit input size according to the LLM's context window capacity to prevent excessive context expansion. For example, inputs exceeding a predefined character limit can be truncated or rejected.
- Monitoring and Alerts: Continuously monitor resource utilization and establish alerts for unusual spikes, which may indicate a DoS attempt. This allows for proactive threat detection and response.
- Developer Awareness and Training: Educate developers about DoS vulnerabilities in LLMs and establish guidelines for secure model deployment. Understanding these risks enables teams to implement preventative measures more effectively.
LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Supply Chain attacks are incredibly common and this is no different with LLMs, which, in this case refers to risks associated with the third-party components, training data, pre-trained models, and deployment platforms used within LLMs. These vulnerabilities can arise from outdated libraries, tampered models, and even compromised data sources, impacting the security and reliability of the entire application. Unlike traditional software supply chain risks, LLM supply chain vulnerabilities extend to the models and datasets themselves, which may be manipulated to include biases, backdoors, or malware that compromises system integrity.
As an example, an organization uses a third-party pre-trained model to conduct economic analysis. If this model is poisoned with incorrect or biased data, it could generate inaccurate results that mislead decision-making. Additionally, if the organization uses an outdated plugin or compromised library, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or tamper with sensitive information. Such vulnerabilities can result in significant security breaches, financial loss, or reputational damage.
How to prevent Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:
- Vet Third-Party Components: Carefully review the terms, privacy policies, and security measures of all third-party model providers, data sources, and plugins. Use only trusted suppliers and ensure they have robust security protocols in place.
- Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): An SBOM provides a complete inventory of all components, allowing for quick detection of vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes. Ensure that all components are up-to-date and apply patches as needed.
- Use Model and Code Signing: For models and external code, employ digital signatures to verify their integrity and authenticity before use. This helps ensure that no tampering has occurred.
- Anomaly Detection and Robustness Testing: Conduct adversarial robustness tests and anomaly detection on models and data to catch signs of tampering or data poisoning. Integrating these checks into your MLOps pipeline can enhance overall security.
- Implement Monitoring and Patching Policies: Regularly monitor component usage, scan for vulnerabilities, and patch outdated components. For sensitive applications, continuously audit your suppliers’ security posture and update components as new threats emerge.
LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure
Sensitive Information Disclosure in LLMs occurs when the model inadvertently reveals private, proprietary, or confidential information through its output. This can happen due to the model being trained on sensitive data or because it memorizes and later reproduces private information. Such disclosures can result in significant security breaches, including unauthorized access to personal data, intellectual property leaks, and violations of privacy laws.
As an example, there could be an LLM-based chatbot trained on a dataset containing personal information such as users’ full names, addresses, or proprietary business data. If the model memorizes this data, it could accidentally reveal this sensitive information to other users. For instance, a user might ask the chatbot for a recommendation, and the model could inadvertently respond with personal information it learned during training, violating privacy rules.
How to prevent Sensitive Information Disclosure:
- Data Sanitization: Before training, scrub datasets of personal or sensitive information. Use techniques like anonymization and redaction to ensure no sensitive data remains in the training data.
- Input and Output Filtering: Implement robust input validation and sanitization to prevent sensitive data from entering the model’s training data or being echoed back in outputs.
- Limit Training Data Exposure: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting sensitive data from being part of the training dataset. Fine-tune the model with only the data necessary for its task, and ensure high-privilege data is not accessible to lower-privilege users.
- User Awareness: Make users aware of how their data is processed by providing clear Terms of Use and offering opt-out options for having their data used in model training.
- Access Controls: Apply strict access control to external data sources used by the LLM, ensuring that sensitive information is handled securely throughout the system
LLM07: Insecure Plugin Design
Insecure Plugin Design vulnerabilities arise when LLM plugins, which extend the model’s capabilities, are not adequately secured. These plugins often allow free-text inputs and may lack proper input validation and access controls. When enabled, plugins can execute various tasks based on the LLM’s outputs without further checks, which can expose the system to risks like data exfiltration, remote code execution, and privilege escalation. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because plugins can operate with elevated permissions while assuming that user inputs are trustworthy.
As an example, there could be a weather plugin that allows users to input a base URL and query. An attacker could craft a malicious input that directs the LLM to a domain they control, allowing them to inject harmful content into the system. Similarly, a plugin that accepts SQL “WHERE” clauses without validation could enable an attacker to execute SQL injection attacks, gaining unauthorized access to data in a database.
How to prevent Insecure Plugin Design:
- Enforce Parameterized Input: Plugins should restrict inputs to specific parameters and avoid free-form text wherever possible. This can prevent injection attacks and other exploits.
- Input Validation and Sanitization: Plugins should include robust validation on all inputs. Using Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) can help identify vulnerabilities during development.
- Access Control: Follow the principle of least privilege, limiting each plugin's permissions to only what is necessary. Implement OAuth2 or API keys to control access and ensure only authorized users or components can trigger sensitive actions.
- Manual Authorization for Sensitive Actions: For actions that could impact user security, such as transferring files or accessing private repositories, require explicit user confirmation.
- Adhere to OWASP API Security Guidelines: Since plugins often function as REST APIs, apply best practices from the OWASP API Security Top 10. This includes securing endpoints and applying rate limiting to mitigate potential abuse.
LLM08: Excessive Agency
Excessive Agency in LLM-based applications arises when models are granted too much autonomy or functionality, allowing them to perform actions beyond their intended scope. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM agent has access to functions that are unnecessary for its purpose or operates with excessive permissions, such as being able to modify or delete records instead of only reading them. Unlike Insecure Output Handling, which deals with the lack of validation on the model’s outputs, Excessive Agency pertains to the risks involved when an LLM takes actions without proper authorization, potentially leading to confidentiality, integrity, and availability issues.
As an example, there could be an LLM-based assistant that is given access to a user's email account to summarize incoming messages. If the plugin that is used to read emails also has permissions to send messages, a malicious prompt injection could trick the LLM into sending unauthorized emails (or spam) from the user's account.
How to prevent Excessive Agency:
- Restrict Plugin Functionality: Ensure plugins and tools only provide necessary functions. For example, if a plugin is used to read emails, it should not include capabilities to delete or send emails.
- Limit Permissions: Follow the principle of least privilege by restricting plugins’ access to external systems. For instance, a plugin for database access should be read-only if writing or modifying data is not required.
- Avoid Open-Ended Functions: Avoid functions like “run shell command” or “fetch URL” that provide broad system access. Instead, use plugins that perform specific, controlled tasks.
- User Authorization and Scope Tracking: Require plugins to execute actions within the context of a specific user's permissions. For example, using OAuth with limited scopes helps ensure actions align with the user’s access level.
- Human-in-the-Loop Control: Require user confirmation for high-impact actions. For instance, a plugin that posts to social media should require the user to review and approve the content before it is published.
- Authorization in Downstream Systems: Implement authorization checks in downstream systems that validate each request against security policies. This prevents the LLM from making unauthorized changes directly.
LLM09: Overreliance
Overreliance occurs when users or systems trust the outputs of a LLM without proper oversight or verification. While LLMs can generate creative and informative content, they are prone to “hallucinations” (producing false or misleading information) or providing authoritative-sounding but incorrect outputs. Overreliance on these models can result in security risks, misinformation, miscommunication, and even legal issues, especially if LLM-generated content is used without validation. This vulnerability becomes especially dangerous in cases where LLMs suggest insecure coding practices or flawed recommendations.
As an example, there could be a development team using an LLM to expedite the coding process. The LLM suggests an insecure code library, and the team, trusting the LLM, incorporates it into their software without review. This introduces a serious vulnerability. As another example, a news organization might use an LLM to generate articles, but if they don’t validate the information, it could lead to the spread of disinformation.
How to prevent Overreliance:
- Regular Monitoring and Review: Implement processes to review LLM outputs regularly. Use techniques like self-consistency checks or voting mechanisms to compare multiple model responses and filter out inconsistencies.
- Cross-Verification: Compare the LLM’s output with reliable, trusted sources to ensure the information’s accuracy. This step is crucial, especially in fields where factual accuracy is imperative.
- Fine-Tuning and Prompt Engineering: Fine-tune models for specific tasks or domains to reduce hallucinations. Techniques like parameter-efficient tuning (PET) and chain-of-thought prompting can help improve the quality of LLM outputs.
- Automated Validation: Use automated validation tools to cross-check generated outputs against known facts or data, adding an extra layer of security.
- Risk Communication: Clearly communicate the limitations of LLMs to users, highlighting the potential for errors. Transparent disclaimers can help manage user expectations and encourage cautious use of LLM outputs.
- Secure Coding Practices: For development environments, establish guidelines to prevent the integration of potentially insecure code. Avoid relying solely on LLM-generated code without thorough review.
LLM10: Model Theft
Model Theft refers to the unauthorized access, extraction, or replication of proprietary LLMs by malicious actors. These models, containing valuable intellectual property, are at risk of exfiltration, which can lead to significant economic and reputational loss, erosion of competitive advantage, and unauthorized access to sensitive information encoded within the model. Attackers may steal models directly from company infrastructure or replicate them by querying APIs to build shadow models that mimic the original. As LLMs become more prevalent, safeguarding their confidentiality and integrity is crucial.
As an example, an attacker could exploit a misconfiguration in a company’s network security settings, gaining access to their LLM model repository. Once inside, the attacker could exfiltrate the proprietary model and use it to build a competing service. Alternatively, an insider may leak model artifacts, allowing adversaries to launch gray box adversarial attacks or fine-tune their own models with stolen data.
How to prevent Model Theft:
- Access Controls and Authentication: Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and enforce strong authentication mechanisms to limit unauthorized access to LLM repositories and training environments. Adhere to the principle of least privilege for all user accounts.
- Supplier and Dependency Management: Monitor and verify the security of suppliers and dependencies to reduce the risk of supply chain attacks, ensuring that third-party components are secure.
- Centralized Model Inventory: Maintain a central ML Model Registry with access controls, logging, and authentication for all production models. This can aid in governance, compliance, and prompt detection of unauthorized activities.
- Network Restrictions: Limit LLM access to internal services, APIs, and network resources. This reduces the attack surface for side-channel attacks or unauthorized model access.
- Continuous Monitoring and Logging: Regularly monitor access logs for unusual activity and promptly address any unauthorized access. Automated governance workflows can also help streamline access and deployment controls.
- Adversarial Robustness: Implement adversarial robustness training to help detect extraction queries and defend against side-channel attacks. Rate-limit API calls to further protect against data exfiltration.
- Watermarking Techniques: Embed unique watermarks within the model to track unauthorized copies or detect theft during the model’s lifecycle.
Wrapping it all up
As LLMs continue to grow in capability and integration across industries, their security risks must be managed with the same vigilance as any other critical system. From Prompt Injection to Model Theft, the vulnerabilities outlined in the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs highlight the unique challenges posed by these models, particularly when they are granted excessive agency or have access to sensitive data. Addressing these risks requires a multifaceted approach involving strict access controls, robust validation processes, continuous monitoring, and proactive governance.
For technical leadership, this means ensuring that development and operational teams implement best practices across the LLM lifecycle starting from securing training data to ensuring safe interaction between LLMs and external systems through plugins and APIs. Prioritizing security frameworks such as the OWASP ASVS, adopting MLOps best practices, and maintaining vigilance over supply chains and insider threats are key steps to safeguarding LLM deployments. Ultimately, strong leadership that emphasizes security-first practices will protect both intellectual property and organizational integrity, while fostering trust in the use of AI technologies.