TL;DR

  • Red teams simulate real-world attacks to find vulnerabilities through techniques like penetration testing and social engineering
  • Blue teams detect, defend, and respond using SIEM solutions and EDR platforms
  • Purple teams combine both perspectives to accelerate security improvements through collaboration
  • Organizations benefit from integrated strategies rather than siloed teams
  • OSCP prepares you for red team roles; CySA+ validates blue team skills; both matter for purple team specialists

For years I worked as a red teamer, and getting that first shell on a target system defined my early career. For someone who conducted undercover operations as a federal agent, you would think the adrenaline would fade, but it did not. Over time, though, my perspective shifted. When I moved into defensive security operations, I discovered something equally demanding: the pressure of being right 100% of the time.

Red teamers need one successful attack to prove their point, while blue teamers must stop hundreds of attacks simultaneously without missing the one that matters. That fundamental difference reveals why modern cybersecurity cannot function with either team in isolation.

Every day, attackers develop new tactics and defenders must evolve to counter them. The organizations that thrive are those that break down the walls between offense and defense, creating feedback loops where each side makes the other stronger. That is where purple teaming enters as the real security transformation.

This blog walks through each team role, how they work together, and what it takes to build or join one.

What Is a Red Team?

A red team’s job is simple in theory, demanding in practice: simulate real-world attackers and find vulnerabilities before threat actors do.

Purpose: Simulating Real-World Attackers

Red teams go beyond vulnerability scanning. While a scanner flags outdated software, a red team asks: "How do I actually exploit this?"

Red teams conduct authorized penetration testing to identify and prove exploitability of weaknesses. They test human vulnerabilities through social engineering campaigns involving phishing and pretexting. They execute physical breach attempts to show how attackers gain access to restricted areas. Advanced multi-stage attacks demonstrate lateral movement and persistence mechanisms that prove an attacker can move through your environment and stay hidden. Cloud infrastructure exploits target common misconfigurations in AWS, Azure, or GCP.

Tools of the Trade

Red teams rely on a toolkit of tailor-made operating systems and exploit frameworks:

  • Kali Linux: The comprehensive collection of offensive security tools, my constant companion through countless engagements
  • Parrot OS: An equally capable alternative designed for pentesting, privacy research, and development
  • Metasploit Framework: The industry standard for developing and delivering exploits
  • Cobalt Strike: Advanced command and control for simulating sophisticated adversary behavior
  • Custom tooling: Every mature red team builds proprietary tools tailored to their assessment approach

What Is a Blue Team?

While a red team needs one successful attack to prove exploitation, a blue team must defend against hundreds of attack vectors simultaneously, every single day.

Purpose: Detect, Defend, and Respond

Blue teams operate continuously to detect, investigate, and respond to threats. The work spans multiple domains: 24/7 security monitoring and log analysis to spot indicators of compromise, firewall management to prevent unauthorized movement, incident response to contain and remediate attacks, threat hunting to proactively search for signs of attacker activity, and defensive hardening through patching and configuration updates.

Transitioning from red to blue team taught me something unexpected: when you spot an attacker in your logs, when you see suspicious API calls that should not be there, when your Splunk search catches lateral movement in real-time, that is an adrenaline hit. You are not defending in the abstract. You are hunting. You are stopping attacks before they spread while the attackers are actually trying.

Tools and Platforms

Blue teams rely on different technologies, primarily focused on visibility and response:

  • SIEM (Security Information and Event Management): Tools like Splunk aggregate and analyze logs from across the infrastructure. The skill is not just running searches; it is tuning queries to separate actionable signals from noise
  • ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana): A cost-effective alternative from Elastic for organizations collecting and visualizing log data
  • Cribl: A platform that optimizes log collection and forwarding to reduce costs and improve signal quality
  • EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response): Tools that monitor endpoints for suspicious behavior from vendors like CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, or Sentinel One
  • IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems): Network-based tools that detect and block suspicious traffic
  • Threat Intelligence: Feeds from sources like Mitre ATT&CK, CrowdStrike, or Shodan that help contextualize alerts and prioritize response

What Is a Purple Team?

For years, red and blue teams operated in silos where red teams delivered reports that blue teams filed away. Purple teaming changes this dynamic by asking: "What if red and blue teams worked together to improve defenses?"

Purpose: Bridge the Gap Through Collaboration

A purple team can take different forms depending on organizational maturity. In some companies, it is a dedicated team that facilitates collaboration between red and blue. In others, it is a mindset and methodology where existing red and blue teams work together directly. Either way, purple teaming blends both perspectives:

  • Shared objectives: Moving from "prove you can attack" to "help us defend better"
  • Continuous feedback loops: Red team insights inform blue team detection; blue team gaps drive red team testing
  • Knowledge sharing: Both sides learn from each other
  • Iterative improvement: Test, defend, measure, refine, repeat

Collaboration Model

The purple team collaboration works through a specific dynamic. Red teams share detailed information about offensive methodologies, attack chains, and exploitation techniques. Blue teams take these tactical insights and use them to develop enhanced detection rules and response procedures. Purple teaming validates that these defenses work against actual attacks, identifies remaining gaps, and drives continuous improvement.

Outcome: Accelerated Security Improvement

The result of effective purple teaming is accelerated security improvement through knowledge sharing. Organizations do not just find vulnerabilities and fix them in isolation; they build a culture where offensive and defensive perspectives continuously inform each other.

I have worked as an overt pentester in organizations where purple teaming was built into engagements. The difference is profound. Instead of delivering a report and leaving, you are in the room with the SOC team, showing them how their detection tools can catch your attacks, tuning Splunk queries together, and collaborating on response playbooks.

How Red, Blue, and Purple Teams Work Together

In immature security operations, these teams do not work together; they often work against each other. Red teams feel blue teams are missing obvious attacks. Blue teams feel red teams are unrealistic. Purple teaming breaks this cycle by establishing shared goals.

Breaking Down Silos

When red and blue teams collaborate:

  • Red teams gain context: Understanding how blue teams detect attacks helps red teams assess real risk, not just theoretical vulnerabilities
  • Blue teams gain insight: Seeing attacks firsthand reveals blind spots in monitoring and response
  • Organizations gain efficiency: Both teams work together to close gaps immediately
  • Threat intelligence improves: Red team findings inform blue team hunting priorities

Real-World Purple Team Engagement

Consider an AWS attack chain where an attacker gains EC2 access through a misconfigured application. A purple team would:

  1. Red team executes: Gain initial EC2 shell access through a web application CVE, retrieve AWS credentials via the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) using Metasploit, and demonstrate lateral movement
  2. Blue team monitors: The SOC monitors EC2 logs, firewall traffic, and CloudTrail through Splunk, looking for suspicious API calls and indicators of compromise
  3. Both teams debrief: The red team shows what artifacts were left behind. The blue team discusses what was detected and what gaps exist, discovering perhaps that IMDS requests were not logged
  4. Refinement: The blue team enables CloudTrail logging and writes Splunk searches to detect anomalous API calls. The red team adjusts tactics
  5. Validation: Re-execute to confirm detection rules work

By the end, the organization has proven its detection capabilities and documented the playbook for future incidents.

When Does an Organization Need Each Team?

Organizations do not mature all at once, and neither do their security programs. The teams you need depend on where you are in your company lifecycle.

Startup Phase: Early-stage companies operate with limited budgets and cannot justify internal red teams. They rely on external penetration testers for annual assessments and implement basic log monitoring. Blue team work is minimal and compliance-driven.

Growth Phase: As organizations expand, they hire dedicated security personnel who wear both offense and defense hats. They conduct annual external pentests while building internal assessment capabilities. SIEM platforms like Splunk get deployed. Purple teaming begins informally, maybe the external pentester sticks around for a week to help the team understand how findings translate to detection.

Enterprise Maturity: Large organizations maintain dedicated red and blue teams with distinct responsibilities. Red teams operate continuously with multiple assessment types throughout the year. SOCs achieve full maturity with integrated SIEM platforms, enterprise-wide EDR deployment, and automated response mechanisms. These organizations run formal purple team programs where red and blue teams collaborate on scheduled scenarios, and some may even establish dedicated purple teams for ongoing collaboration and validation. The security organization develops specialized roles including threat hunters who proactively search for adversaries, incident responders with deep forensics expertise, and security architects who design comprehensive security strategies.

Build vs. Buy: Red teaming is often outsourced to gain external perspective and fresh attack methodologies. Blue teaming is typically built in-house because it requires intimate knowledge of your specific infrastructure, applications, and business processes. Purple teaming usually follows a hybrid model where internal blue teams work with external red teamers, or internal red teams collaborate with the SOC on controlled scenarios. Some mature organizations build dedicated purple teams to facilitate ongoing collaboration and continuously validate security controls.

Career Paths: Which Team Is Right for You?

Understanding these team structures is critical if you are building a cybersecurity career. The path you choose impacts the skills you develop, the certifications that matter to employers, and the mindset you cultivate.

Red Team Career Path

Red teamers are problem-solvers. They need technical skills (scripting, networking, system administration), creative thinking, persistence, and operational security mindset.

Key Certifications:

  • OSCP (Offensive Security Certified Professional): The gold standard from Offensive Security with a 48-hour practical exam where you must exploit real vulnerabilities
  • CEH (Certified Ethical Hacker): EC-Council certification well-recognized in government and DoD environments
  • GPEN (GIAC Penetration Tester): From GIAC, validates hands-on penetration testing with practical exam components

Mindset: Red teamers live for that moment when code execution is achieved. The work is intellectually demanding, and success comes through methodical persistence.

Blue Team Career Path

Blue teamers are analysts and strategists. They need analytical skills, tool proficiency (SIEM, EDR, firewalls), strong communication, and patience with false positives.

Key Certifications:

  • CompTIA CySA+ (Cybersecurity Analyst+): The premier blue team credential from CompTIA validating data analysis and threat identification with performance-based questions
  • CompTIA Security+: Foundational credential from CompTIA covering network security, cryptography, and compliance
  • GIAC GCIA (Intrusion Analyst): From GIAC, specializes in network intrusion detection with hands-on packet capture
  • Splunk Certifications: Validate hands-on SIEM deployment and optimization

Mindset: Where red teamers thrive on finding the one thing that breaks the system, blue teamers take pride in stopping true positives from thousands of alerts daily. The victory is not flashy, but it is continuous and aligned with keeping organizations safe.

Purple Team / Hybrid Path

Purple teamers are translators and system thinkers. They need red team fundamentals to understand real attacks, blue team fundamentals to recognize detection gaps, communication mastery, and strategic thinking.

Key Certifications:

  • Both paths: OSCP plus CySA+ demonstrates mastery across the spectrum
  • SANS SEC599: Defeating Advanced Adversaries teaches purple team methodology
  • Specialized certifications in threat intelligence (GCTI) and incident response (GCIH) from GIAC

Mindset: The best purple teamers have spent time on both sides. They understand red team creativity without losing blue team discipline. They appreciate that the goal is not to "win" an engagement; it is to improve security outcomes.

Conclusion

Red teams find the problems, blue teams solve them, and purple teams ensure the two work together effectively.

Organizations that maintain red teams without corresponding blue team capability create reports that nobody acts on, while organizations that build blue teams without red team input end up defending against yesterday attacks. The organizations that thrive embrace the full spectrum: proactive offense, continuous defense, and collaborative iteration.

Purple teaming is no longer a luxury. As threats become more sophisticated, the feedback loop between red and blue teams is critical to modern threat detection and prevention. Organizations that integrate offensive insights directly into their defensive operations do not just catch more attacks; they understand the attackers’ mindset and can anticipate future tactics.

If you are starting your cybersecurity career, do not think of red versus blue as a binary choice. The most valuable security professionals understand both perspectives. For those pursuing the blue team path, the CompTIA CySA+ credential is your validation, and the Cybrary CySA+ certification path provides structured training with hands-on labs. For those wanting to "hack the planet," the penetration tester career path from Cybrary covers certifications like CEH and OSCP.

The security teams winning today do not work in silos. They collaborate, they adapt, and they iterate. Be part of that team. Start your red, blue, or purple team career path today with Cybrary!

The Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) is a community-led organization and has been around for over 20 years and is largely known for its Top 10 web application security risks (check out our course on it). As the use of generative AI and large language models (LLMs) has exploded recently, so too has the risk to privacy and security by these technologies. OWASP, leading the charge for security, has come out with its Top 10 for LLMs and Generative AI Apps this year. In this blog post we’ll explore the Top 10 risks and explore examples of each as well as how to prevent these risks.

LLM01: Prompt Injection

Those familiar with the OWASP Top 10 for web applications have seen the injection category before at the top of the list for many years. This is no exception with LLMs and ranks as number one. Prompt Injection can be a critical vulnerability in LLMs where an attacker manipulates the model through crafted inputs, leading it to execute unintended actions. This can result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or social engineering. There are two types: Direct Prompt Injection, which involves "jailbreaking" the system by altering or revealing underlying system prompts, giving an attacker access to backend systems or sensitive data, and Indirect Prompt Injection, where external inputs (like files or web content) are used to manipulate the LLM's behavior.

As an example, an attacker might upload a resume containing an indirect prompt injection, instructing an LLM-based hiring tool to favorably evaluate the resume. When an internal user runs the document through the LLM for summarization, the embedded prompt makes the LLM respond positively about the candidate’s suitability, regardless of the actual content.

How to prevent prompt injection:

  1. Limit LLM Access: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting the LLM's access to sensitive backend systems and enforcing API token controls for extended functionalities like plugins.
  2. Human Approval for Critical Actions: For high-risk operations, require human validation before executing, ensuring that the LLM's suggestions are not followed blindly.
  3. Separate External and User Content: Use frameworks like ChatML for OpenAI API calls to clearly differentiate between user prompts and untrusted external content, reducing the chance of unintentional action from mixed inputs.
  4. Monitor and Flag Untrusted Outputs: Regularly review LLM outputs and mark suspicious content, helping users to recognize potentially unreliable information.

LLM02: Insecure Output Handling

Insecure Output Handling occurs when the outputs generated by a LLM are not properly validated or sanitized before being used by other components in a system. Since LLMs can generate various types of content based on input prompts, failing to handle these outputs securely can introduce risks like cross-site scripting (XSS), server-side request forgery (SSRF), or even remote code execution (RCE). Unlike Overreliance (LLM09), which focuses on the accuracy of LLM outputs, Insecure Output Handling specifically addresses vulnerabilities in how these outputs are processed downstream.

As an example, there could be a web application that uses an LLM to summarize user-provided content and renders it back in a webpage. An attacker submits a prompt containing malicious JavaScript code. If the LLM’s output is displayed on the webpage without proper sanitization, the JavaScript will execute in the user’s browser, leading to XSS. Alternatively, if the LLM’s output is sent to a backend database or shell command, it could allow SQL injection or remote code execution if not properly validated.

How to prevent Insecure Output Handling:

  1. Zero-Trust Approach: Treat the LLM as an untrusted source, applying strict allow list validation and sanitization to all outputs it generates, especially before passing them to downstream systems or functions.
  2. Output Encoding: Encode LLM outputs before displaying them to end users, particularly when dealing with web content where XSS risks are prevalent.
  3. Adhere to Security Standards: Follow the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) guidelines, which provide strategies for input validation and sanitization to protect against code injection risks.

LLM03: Training Data Poisoning

Training Data Poisoning refers to the manipulation of the data used to train LLMs, introducing biases, backdoors, or vulnerabilities. This tampered data can degrade the model's effectiveness, introduce harmful biases, or create security flaws that malicious actors can exploit. Poisoned data could lead to inaccurate or inappropriate outputs, compromising user trust, harming brand reputation, and increasing security risks like downstream exploitation.

As an example, there could be a scenario where an LLM is trained on a dataset that has been tampered with by a malicious actor. The poisoned dataset includes subtly manipulated content, such as biased news articles or fabricated facts. When the model is deployed, it may output biased information or incorrect details based on the poisoned data. This not only degrades the model’s performance but can also mislead users, potentially harming the model’s credibility and the organization’s reputation.

How to prevent Training Data Poisoning:

  1. Data Validation and Vetting: Verify the sources of training data, especially when sourcing from third-party datasets. Conduct thorough checks on data integrity, and where possible, use trusted data sources.
  2. Machine Learning Bill of Materials (ML-BOM): Maintain an ML-BOM to track the provenance of training data and ensure that each source is legitimate and suitable for the model’s purpose.
  3. Sandboxing and Network Controls: Restrict access to external data sources and use network controls to prevent unintended data scraping during training. This helps ensure that only vetted data is used for training.
  4. Adversarial Robustness Techniques: Implement strategies like federated learning and statistical outlier detection to reduce the impact of poisoned data. Periodic testing and monitoring can identify unusual model behaviors that may indicate a poisoning attempt.
  5. Human Review and Auditing: Regularly audit model outputs and use a human-in-the-loop approach to validate outputs, especially for sensitive applications. This added layer of scrutiny can catch potential issues early.

LLM04: Model Denial of Service

Model Denial of Service (DoS) is a vulnerability in which an attacker deliberately consumes an excessive amount of computational resources by interacting with a LLM. This can result in degraded service quality, increased costs, or even system crashes. One emerging concern is manipulating the context window of the LLM, which refers to the maximum amount of text the model can process at once. This makes it possible to overwhelm the LLM by exceeding or exploiting this limit, leading to resource exhaustion.

As an example, an attacker may continuously flood the LLM with sequential inputs that each reach the upper limit of the model’s context window. This high-volume, resource-intensive traffic overloads the system, resulting in slower response times and even denial of service. As another example, if an LLM-based chatbot is inundated with a flood of recursive or exceptionally long prompts, it can strain computational resources, causing system crashes or significant delays for other users.

How to prevent Model Denial of Service:

  1. Rate Limiting: Implement rate limits to restrict the number of requests from a single user or IP address within a specific timeframe. This reduces the chance of overwhelming the system with excessive traffic.
  2. Resource Allocation Caps: Set caps on resource usage per request to ensure that complex or high-resource requests do not consume excessive CPU or memory. This helps prevent resource exhaustion.
  3. Input Size Restrictions: Limit input size according to the LLM's context window capacity to prevent excessive context expansion. For example, inputs exceeding a predefined character limit can be truncated or rejected.
  4. Monitoring and Alerts: Continuously monitor resource utilization and establish alerts for unusual spikes, which may indicate a DoS attempt. This allows for proactive threat detection and response.
  5. Developer Awareness and Training: Educate developers about DoS vulnerabilities in LLMs and establish guidelines for secure model deployment. Understanding these risks enables teams to implement preventative measures more effectively.

LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Supply Chain attacks are incredibly common and this is no different with LLMs, which, in this case refers to risks associated with the third-party components, training data, pre-trained models, and deployment platforms used within LLMs. These vulnerabilities can arise from outdated libraries, tampered models, and even compromised data sources, impacting the security and reliability of the entire application. Unlike traditional software supply chain risks, LLM supply chain vulnerabilities extend to the models and datasets themselves, which may be manipulated to include biases, backdoors, or malware that compromises system integrity.

As an example, an organization uses a third-party pre-trained model to conduct economic analysis. If this model is poisoned with incorrect or biased data, it could generate inaccurate results that mislead decision-making. Additionally, if the organization uses an outdated plugin or compromised library, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or tamper with sensitive information. Such vulnerabilities can result in significant security breaches, financial loss, or reputational damage.

How to prevent Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:

  1. Vet Third-Party Components: Carefully review the terms, privacy policies, and security measures of all third-party model providers, data sources, and plugins. Use only trusted suppliers and ensure they have robust security protocols in place.
  2. Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): An SBOM provides a complete inventory of all components, allowing for quick detection of vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes. Ensure that all components are up-to-date and apply patches as needed.
  3. Use Model and Code Signing: For models and external code, employ digital signatures to verify their integrity and authenticity before use. This helps ensure that no tampering has occurred.
  4. Anomaly Detection and Robustness Testing: Conduct adversarial robustness tests and anomaly detection on models and data to catch signs of tampering or data poisoning. Integrating these checks into your MLOps pipeline can enhance overall security.
  5. Implement Monitoring and Patching Policies: Regularly monitor component usage, scan for vulnerabilities, and patch outdated components. For sensitive applications, continuously audit your suppliers’ security posture and update components as new threats emerge.

LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure

Sensitive Information Disclosure in LLMs occurs when the model inadvertently reveals private, proprietary, or confidential information through its output. This can happen due to the model being trained on sensitive data or because it memorizes and later reproduces private information. Such disclosures can result in significant security breaches, including unauthorized access to personal data, intellectual property leaks, and violations of privacy laws.

As an example, there could be an LLM-based chatbot trained on a dataset containing personal information such as users’ full names, addresses, or proprietary business data. If the model memorizes this data, it could accidentally reveal this sensitive information to other users. For instance, a user might ask the chatbot for a recommendation, and the model could inadvertently respond with personal information it learned during training, violating privacy rules.

How to prevent Sensitive Information Disclosure:

  1. Data Sanitization: Before training, scrub datasets of personal or sensitive information. Use techniques like anonymization and redaction to ensure no sensitive data remains in the training data.
  2. Input and Output Filtering: Implement robust input validation and sanitization to prevent sensitive data from entering the model’s training data or being echoed back in outputs.
  3. Limit Training Data Exposure: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting sensitive data from being part of the training dataset. Fine-tune the model with only the data necessary for its task, and ensure high-privilege data is not accessible to lower-privilege users.
  4. User Awareness: Make users aware of how their data is processed by providing clear Terms of Use and offering opt-out options for having their data used in model training.
  5. Access Controls: Apply strict access control to external data sources used by the LLM, ensuring that sensitive information is handled securely throughout the system

LLM07: Insecure Plugin Design

Insecure Plugin Design vulnerabilities arise when LLM plugins, which extend the model’s capabilities, are not adequately secured. These plugins often allow free-text inputs and may lack proper input validation and access controls. When enabled, plugins can execute various tasks based on the LLM’s outputs without further checks, which can expose the system to risks like data exfiltration, remote code execution, and privilege escalation. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because plugins can operate with elevated permissions while assuming that user inputs are trustworthy.

As an example, there could be a weather plugin that allows users to input a base URL and query. An attacker could craft a malicious input that directs the LLM to a domain they control, allowing them to inject harmful content into the system. Similarly, a plugin that accepts SQL “WHERE” clauses without validation could enable an attacker to execute SQL injection attacks, gaining unauthorized access to data in a database.

How to prevent Insecure Plugin Design:

  1. Enforce Parameterized Input: Plugins should restrict inputs to specific parameters and avoid free-form text wherever possible. This can prevent injection attacks and other exploits.
  2. Input Validation and Sanitization: Plugins should include robust validation on all inputs. Using Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) can help identify vulnerabilities during development.
  3. Access Control: Follow the principle of least privilege, limiting each plugin's permissions to only what is necessary. Implement OAuth2 or API keys to control access and ensure only authorized users or components can trigger sensitive actions.
  4. Manual Authorization for Sensitive Actions: For actions that could impact user security, such as transferring files or accessing private repositories, require explicit user confirmation.
  5. Adhere to OWASP API Security Guidelines: Since plugins often function as REST APIs, apply best practices from the OWASP API Security Top 10. This includes securing endpoints and applying rate limiting to mitigate potential abuse.

LLM08: Excessive Agency

Excessive Agency in LLM-based applications arises when models are granted too much autonomy or functionality, allowing them to perform actions beyond their intended scope. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM agent has access to functions that are unnecessary for its purpose or operates with excessive permissions, such as being able to modify or delete records instead of only reading them. Unlike Insecure Output Handling, which deals with the lack of validation on the model’s outputs, Excessive Agency pertains to the risks involved when an LLM takes actions without proper authorization, potentially leading to confidentiality, integrity, and availability issues.

As an example, there could be an LLM-based assistant that is given access to a user's email account to summarize incoming messages. If the plugin that is used to read emails also has permissions to send messages, a malicious prompt injection could trick the LLM into sending unauthorized emails (or spam) from the user's account.

How to prevent Excessive Agency:

  1. Restrict Plugin Functionality: Ensure plugins and tools only provide necessary functions. For example, if a plugin is used to read emails, it should not include capabilities to delete or send emails.
  2. Limit Permissions: Follow the principle of least privilege by restricting plugins’ access to external systems. For instance, a plugin for database access should be read-only if writing or modifying data is not required.
  3. Avoid Open-Ended Functions: Avoid functions like “run shell command” or “fetch URL” that provide broad system access. Instead, use plugins that perform specific, controlled tasks.
  4. User Authorization and Scope Tracking: Require plugins to execute actions within the context of a specific user's permissions. For example, using OAuth with limited scopes helps ensure actions align with the user’s access level.
  5. Human-in-the-Loop Control: Require user confirmation for high-impact actions. For instance, a plugin that posts to social media should require the user to review and approve the content before it is published.
  6. Authorization in Downstream Systems: Implement authorization checks in downstream systems that validate each request against security policies. This prevents the LLM from making unauthorized changes directly.

LLM09: Overreliance

Overreliance occurs when users or systems trust the outputs of a LLM without proper oversight or verification. While LLMs can generate creative and informative content, they are prone to “hallucinations” (producing false or misleading information) or providing authoritative-sounding but incorrect outputs. Overreliance on these models can result in security risks, misinformation, miscommunication, and even legal issues, especially if LLM-generated content is used without validation. This vulnerability becomes especially dangerous in cases where LLMs suggest insecure coding practices or flawed recommendations.

As an example, there could be a development team using an LLM to expedite the coding process. The LLM suggests an insecure code library, and the team, trusting the LLM, incorporates it into their software without review. This introduces a serious vulnerability. As another example, a news organization might use an LLM to generate articles, but if they don’t validate the information, it could lead to the spread of disinformation.

How to prevent Overreliance:

  1. Regular Monitoring and Review: Implement processes to review LLM outputs regularly. Use techniques like self-consistency checks or voting mechanisms to compare multiple model responses and filter out inconsistencies.
  2. Cross-Verification: Compare the LLM’s output with reliable, trusted sources to ensure the information’s accuracy. This step is crucial, especially in fields where factual accuracy is imperative.
  3. Fine-Tuning and Prompt Engineering: Fine-tune models for specific tasks or domains to reduce hallucinations. Techniques like parameter-efficient tuning (PET) and chain-of-thought prompting can help improve the quality of LLM outputs.
  4. Automated Validation: Use automated validation tools to cross-check generated outputs against known facts or data, adding an extra layer of security.
  5. Risk Communication: Clearly communicate the limitations of LLMs to users, highlighting the potential for errors. Transparent disclaimers can help manage user expectations and encourage cautious use of LLM outputs.
  6. Secure Coding Practices: For development environments, establish guidelines to prevent the integration of potentially insecure code. Avoid relying solely on LLM-generated code without thorough review.

LLM10: Model Theft

Model Theft refers to the unauthorized access, extraction, or replication of proprietary LLMs by malicious actors. These models, containing valuable intellectual property, are at risk of exfiltration, which can lead to significant economic and reputational loss, erosion of competitive advantage, and unauthorized access to sensitive information encoded within the model. Attackers may steal models directly from company infrastructure or replicate them by querying APIs to build shadow models that mimic the original. As LLMs become more prevalent, safeguarding their confidentiality and integrity is crucial.

As an example, an attacker could exploit a misconfiguration in a company’s network security settings, gaining access to their LLM model repository. Once inside, the attacker could exfiltrate the proprietary model and use it to build a competing service. Alternatively, an insider may leak model artifacts, allowing adversaries to launch gray box adversarial attacks or fine-tune their own models with stolen data.

How to prevent Model Theft:

  1. Access Controls and Authentication: Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and enforce strong authentication mechanisms to limit unauthorized access to LLM repositories and training environments. Adhere to the principle of least privilege for all user accounts.
  2. Supplier and Dependency Management: Monitor and verify the security of suppliers and dependencies to reduce the risk of supply chain attacks, ensuring that third-party components are secure.
  3. Centralized Model Inventory: Maintain a central ML Model Registry with access controls, logging, and authentication for all production models. This can aid in governance, compliance, and prompt detection of unauthorized activities.
  4. Network Restrictions: Limit LLM access to internal services, APIs, and network resources. This reduces the attack surface for side-channel attacks or unauthorized model access.
  5. Continuous Monitoring and Logging: Regularly monitor access logs for unusual activity and promptly address any unauthorized access. Automated governance workflows can also help streamline access and deployment controls.
  6. Adversarial Robustness: Implement adversarial robustness training to help detect extraction queries and defend against side-channel attacks. Rate-limit API calls to further protect against data exfiltration.
  7. Watermarking Techniques: Embed unique watermarks within the model to track unauthorized copies or detect theft during the model’s lifecycle.

Wrapping it all up

As LLMs continue to grow in capability and integration across industries, their security risks must be managed with the same vigilance as any other critical system. From Prompt Injection to Model Theft, the vulnerabilities outlined in the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs highlight the unique challenges posed by these models, particularly when they are granted excessive agency or have access to sensitive data. Addressing these risks requires a multifaceted approach involving strict access controls, robust validation processes, continuous monitoring, and proactive governance.

For technical leadership, this means ensuring that development and operational teams implement best practices across the LLM lifecycle starting from securing training data to ensuring safe interaction between LLMs and external systems through plugins and APIs. Prioritizing security frameworks such as the OWASP ASVS, adopting MLOps best practices, and maintaining vigilance over supply chains and insider threats are key steps to safeguarding LLM deployments. Ultimately, strong leadership that emphasizes security-first practices will protect both intellectual property and organizational integrity, while fostering trust in the use of AI technologies.

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