TL;DR
Security Awareness Training (SAT) has outgrown the era of once-a-year videos and perfunctory quizzes. In 2025, the organizations that actually lower risk treat SAT as an operational control - something that shapes daily decisions, supports audits with credible evidence, and pays for itself through fewer incidents and faster response when problems do occur. This guide explains why SAT matters now, how to design a program that works for modern teams, and how to implement it pragmatically with Cybrary while keeping the focus on outcomes rather than box-checking.
What SAT is (and what it isn’t)
At its core, SAT is the ongoing work of teaching people to notice risk, choose safer actions, and report issues quickly enough for the organization to contain them. It is not a one-time compliance hurdle or a substitute for technical controls. It sits alongside identity, endpoint, data protection, and monitoring as a human-layer control, turning moments of uncertainty, an odd email, a login prompt that looks off, a hurried change request, into moments of prevention. The best programs feel relevant to the tools employees actually use, and they show up often enough to influence habits without becoming noise.
Why it matters in 2025
The attack surface keeps expanding in subtle, human ways. Hybrid work normalizes access from home networks and shared devices. Cloud services multiply sign-ins and tokens. Generative tools accelerate phishing quality and volume. Meanwhile, regulators and boards are asking sharper questions: not “did we assign training?” but “how do we know it worked?” SAT earns its place when it can demonstrate behavior change, smoother incident handoffs, and cleaner audits. It also addresses a talent reality many teams overlook: a significant share of “security” tasks live with non-security roles - help desk, developers, cloud engineers, data teams, and vendor managers. If they don’t get practical, role-aware guidance, risk shifts right back into operations.
Principles that separate effective programs from the rest
A modern program is frequent, relevant, practiced, measured, and mapped. Frequency matters because attention wanes; short, recurring touchpoints reshape habits better than long annual marathons. Relevance matters because people remember what feels close to their work; show real inbox screenshots, real cloud consoles, real service desk flows. Practice matters because muscle memory beats trivia; labs, phishing drills, and tabletop exercises create recall under pressure. Measurement matters because leaders need a story they can trust; track a handful of leading signals and the operational outcomes that follow. Mapping matters because auditors will ask; connect lessons and drills to the control families you claim (NIST, ISO 27001, SOC 2, PCI, HIPAA) so evidence is easy to export and defend.
Designing the program architecture in prose, not checkboxes
Think of the program as a rhythm rather than a curriculum. For the whole organization, plan short awareness moments that repeat throughout the year. Five to ten minutes is enough when the content is concrete: how to recognize credential-harvest pages, why password managers eliminate the reuse trap, what a legitimate MFA prompt looks like, where to report something suspicious, how to handle sensitive files when moving between personal and corporate tools. The tone should be conversational and plain - people don’t need jargon; they need clarity and next steps.
Layer on role-based learning for the groups who build and operate systems. IT support needs to practice hardening baselines and managing identities. Developers need language-specific secure coding habits that fit into their CI pipeline rather than fight it. Cloud and data teams need configuration guardrails, key rotation, and segregation patterns they can implement without guesswork. SOC analysts and incident responders need repeatable drills that sharpen triage and evidence handling. These aren’t abstract topics; they are job tasks, and the instruction should look like those tasks.
Practice is where the learning transfers. Put people into safe environments where they can try the thing you want them to do: rotate a key, enable conditional access, analyze a packet capture, write a unit test that catches an OWASP-class issue, escalate a suspicious email with the right context attached. When they stumble, give hints and let them try again. Track not just pass/fail, but time-to-pass; it tells you whether the habit is forming.
Simulations complete the loop. Phishing campaigns teach recognition and reporting. Start with straightforward lures and increase sophistication quarter by quarter, mirroring what your adversaries try in the wild - credential harvests, vendor impersonation, and MFA fatigue. Tabletop exercises bring Security, IT, Legal, Communications, HR, and a line-of-business leader into a two-hour scenario that forces decisions: who declares, who informs customers, who preserves evidence, who approves downtime. The value is not theatrics; it’s the clarity that emerges about handoffs and authority.
Behind the scenes, operations make the program sustainable. Provisioning ties to identity and HR so people see the right material at the right time. Reporting speaks both to managers who coach their teams and auditors who evaluate your controls. New hires complete essentials in their first week; contractors get time-boxed access and must finish the basics before touching sensitive systems. None of this should require heroics. If running the program is painful, your team won’t be consistent with it.
Aligning the work with frameworks without losing the plot
Audits are easier when you keep a living map of what you teach, how often you teach it, and which controls it satisfies. A simple, one-page crosswalk is enough: this awareness cadence aligns to NIST AT-2 and ISO A.6.3; these role-based modules address AT-3; these phishing and tabletop artifacts show evidence of effectiveness; these onboarding records demonstrate coverage for new hires and contractors. Update the map each quarter. Store the exports where your GRC team expects to find them. When assessors ask, you won’t scramble; you’ll show them exactly how training operates as a control.
Launching without the drama: a 90-day plan
Successful launches start small and prove value quickly. In the first two weeks, name the top human risks you actually see - maybe hurried approvals of suspicious invoices, lax use of password managers, or misconfigured cloud roles. Decide how you’ll know things are improving: faster reporting, lower click rates, fewer compromised accounts, cleaner audits. Connect your training platform to SSO and HR so assignments land automatically. Record a sixty-second executive kickoff video that says, plainly, why the program matters and what people should do when something looks off.
By the end of the first month, run a baseline phishing simulation and assign the shortest, most useful lessons to everyone. Give technical teams their first hands-on labs - two or three tasks that feel like their real work, not a tour of generic theory. Share progress with managers, not as a scoreboard, but as a coaching tool: here’s what your team completed, here’s where they struggled, here’s how to help. In the second month, hold your first tabletop. Keep it tight, capture decisions and gaps, and assign owners with dates. If patterns emerge (repeat clickers, slow reporters) offer respectful, targeted refreshers rather than public callouts. Close the quarter with a simple story: what changed, where risk remains, and what you’ll adjust next.
Culture without the posters
Culture shows up in small, repeated moments. When a senior leader mentions security in a town hall, shares a near-miss, and thanks the person who reported it, the room notices. When frontline managers reserve sixty seconds at the end of staff meetings for a quick “security spotlight,” tips start to travel. When someone reports a crafty phish and gets a private thank-you, or a shout-out in the group chat, the behavior spreads. When someone clicks twice in a month and receives quiet coaching instead of a public scolding, trust survives. And when the secure path is the easy path (think password managers deployed and pre-configured, sensible defaults in cloud services, a one-click “report suspicious” button in email and chat) people don’t need to be heroes to do the right thing.
Measuring what matters and telling an ROI story people believe
Leaders are not asking for screenshots of completion rates; they want to know whether behavior is changing, whether operational risk is trending down, and whether the investment makes sense. Tell the story in three acts.
In the first act, watch the early signals that move before incidents do. Participation spreads to every department. The time it takes to finish micro-lessons drops from a week to a couple of days. Lab pass rates climb and retries shorten. Most encouragingly, more people press “report phishing” within the first hour of a campaign. You haven’t eliminated risk, but you’ve shown that new habits are taking root.
In the second act, connect those habits to production outcomes. Phish click rates fall and stay low, not just once but across campaigns. Credential submission becomes rare. Help desk tickets tied to compromised accounts taper off. Responders see suspicious emails sooner and contain them faster because reports arrive early with good context. Tabletop exercises end with clearer handoffs and fewer “who decides?” moments. When auditors visit, training stops being a finding because completion, remediation, and evidence sit neatly where they’re supposed to.
In the third act, translate outcomes into money without theatrics. Estimate your annual exposure to human-driven incidents before the program, then apply a conservative reduction based on what you’ve measured. If you were seeing six such incidents a year at roughly $120,000 each, your exposure was about $720,000. Two quarters later, a sustained drop in clicks, faster reporting, and cleaner handoffs may credibly support a forty-percent reduction to around $432,000. If the program cost $95,000 to run, the return is about 203 percent. No one expects perfect precision; they expect transparency about inputs and time windows, backed by a couple of real stories - like the invoice phish that was reported in minutes and contained before finance ever saw it.
Package this story the same way every quarter. Show what moved and why, include a simple chart for click and report rates, note the SLAs you met for new hires and remediation, and recalc the exposure and ROI with the same formula. Consistency builds trust.
Implementing with Cybrary
Cybrary fits naturally into this model when you treat it as the engine for role-based learning and hands-on practice, with awareness moments wrapped around it. Use Cybrary’s on-demand lessons to create short, monthly touchpoints for the whole organization, and enroll technical groups in the content that match their jobs - IT operations, cloud engineering, secure coding, SOC analysis. Assign labs that mirror your stack so practice feels familiar, not theoretical. Pair phishing simulations and table-tops from your preferred tools with relevant Cybrary modules as pre-work or remediation. Export completion and lab outcomes on a cadence that matches your audits and keep them tied to your control map.
Accessibility, localization, and policy without friction
Make SAT easy to consume for everyone. Provide captions and transcripts, keep visuals readable, and ensure lessons work well on mobile for field teams. Avoid idioms that don’t translate and adapt examples to local regulations when you operate across regions. Be upfront about what you track during training and simulations, how long you retain the data, and that the intent is coaching and compliance, not public shaming. For contractors and vendors, require essentials before access and limit entitlements by time and role. These decisions reduce both legal risk and cultural resistance.
Common ways programs stumble (and how to sidestep them)
Programs falter when they appear once a year and disappear, when content feels generic or scolding, when leaders are absent, when remediation looks punitive, or when reporting is a maze. The cure is mundane but powerful: keep the cadence short and steady, root examples in your own tools and incidents, ask leaders for sixty seconds of visible support, coach privately, and make reporting a single, obvious click.
What success looks like after a year
A year into a healthy program, the organization tends to feel calmer about human-layer risk not because threats vanished but because responses improved. Employees report suspicious messages quickly without fear of embarrassment. Technical teams complete short labs that shave time off real work. Incident handlers see patterns sooner and escalate less often. Audits become about confirmation rather than discovery. The SAT program is no longer an event on the calendar; it’s part of how the company operates.
The Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) is a community-led organization and has been around for over 20 years and is largely known for its Top 10 web application security risks (check out our course on it). As the use of generative AI and large language models (LLMs) has exploded recently, so too has the risk to privacy and security by these technologies. OWASP, leading the charge for security, has come out with its Top 10 for LLMs and Generative AI Apps this year. In this blog post we’ll explore the Top 10 risks and explore examples of each as well as how to prevent these risks.
LLM01: Prompt Injection
Those familiar with the OWASP Top 10 for web applications have seen the injection category before at the top of the list for many years. This is no exception with LLMs and ranks as number one. Prompt Injection can be a critical vulnerability in LLMs where an attacker manipulates the model through crafted inputs, leading it to execute unintended actions. This can result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or social engineering. There are two types: Direct Prompt Injection, which involves "jailbreaking" the system by altering or revealing underlying system prompts, giving an attacker access to backend systems or sensitive data, and Indirect Prompt Injection, where external inputs (like files or web content) are used to manipulate the LLM's behavior.
As an example, an attacker might upload a resume containing an indirect prompt injection, instructing an LLM-based hiring tool to favorably evaluate the resume. When an internal user runs the document through the LLM for summarization, the embedded prompt makes the LLM respond positively about the candidate’s suitability, regardless of the actual content.
How to prevent prompt injection:
- Limit LLM Access: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting the LLM's access to sensitive backend systems and enforcing API token controls for extended functionalities like plugins.
- Human Approval for Critical Actions: For high-risk operations, require human validation before executing, ensuring that the LLM's suggestions are not followed blindly.
- Separate External and User Content: Use frameworks like ChatML for OpenAI API calls to clearly differentiate between user prompts and untrusted external content, reducing the chance of unintentional action from mixed inputs.
- Monitor and Flag Untrusted Outputs: Regularly review LLM outputs and mark suspicious content, helping users to recognize potentially unreliable information.
LLM02: Insecure Output Handling
Insecure Output Handling occurs when the outputs generated by a LLM are not properly validated or sanitized before being used by other components in a system. Since LLMs can generate various types of content based on input prompts, failing to handle these outputs securely can introduce risks like cross-site scripting (XSS), server-side request forgery (SSRF), or even remote code execution (RCE). Unlike Overreliance (LLM09), which focuses on the accuracy of LLM outputs, Insecure Output Handling specifically addresses vulnerabilities in how these outputs are processed downstream.
As an example, there could be a web application that uses an LLM to summarize user-provided content and renders it back in a webpage. An attacker submits a prompt containing malicious JavaScript code. If the LLM’s output is displayed on the webpage without proper sanitization, the JavaScript will execute in the user’s browser, leading to XSS. Alternatively, if the LLM’s output is sent to a backend database or shell command, it could allow SQL injection or remote code execution if not properly validated.
How to prevent Insecure Output Handling:
- Zero-Trust Approach: Treat the LLM as an untrusted source, applying strict allow list validation and sanitization to all outputs it generates, especially before passing them to downstream systems or functions.
- Output Encoding: Encode LLM outputs before displaying them to end users, particularly when dealing with web content where XSS risks are prevalent.
- Adhere to Security Standards: Follow the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) guidelines, which provide strategies for input validation and sanitization to protect against code injection risks.
LLM03: Training Data Poisoning
Training Data Poisoning refers to the manipulation of the data used to train LLMs, introducing biases, backdoors, or vulnerabilities. This tampered data can degrade the model's effectiveness, introduce harmful biases, or create security flaws that malicious actors can exploit. Poisoned data could lead to inaccurate or inappropriate outputs, compromising user trust, harming brand reputation, and increasing security risks like downstream exploitation.
As an example, there could be a scenario where an LLM is trained on a dataset that has been tampered with by a malicious actor. The poisoned dataset includes subtly manipulated content, such as biased news articles or fabricated facts. When the model is deployed, it may output biased information or incorrect details based on the poisoned data. This not only degrades the model’s performance but can also mislead users, potentially harming the model’s credibility and the organization’s reputation.
How to prevent Training Data Poisoning:
- Data Validation and Vetting: Verify the sources of training data, especially when sourcing from third-party datasets. Conduct thorough checks on data integrity, and where possible, use trusted data sources.
- Machine Learning Bill of Materials (ML-BOM): Maintain an ML-BOM to track the provenance of training data and ensure that each source is legitimate and suitable for the model’s purpose.
- Sandboxing and Network Controls: Restrict access to external data sources and use network controls to prevent unintended data scraping during training. This helps ensure that only vetted data is used for training.
- Adversarial Robustness Techniques: Implement strategies like federated learning and statistical outlier detection to reduce the impact of poisoned data. Periodic testing and monitoring can identify unusual model behaviors that may indicate a poisoning attempt.
- Human Review and Auditing: Regularly audit model outputs and use a human-in-the-loop approach to validate outputs, especially for sensitive applications. This added layer of scrutiny can catch potential issues early.
LLM04: Model Denial of Service
Model Denial of Service (DoS) is a vulnerability in which an attacker deliberately consumes an excessive amount of computational resources by interacting with a LLM. This can result in degraded service quality, increased costs, or even system crashes. One emerging concern is manipulating the context window of the LLM, which refers to the maximum amount of text the model can process at once. This makes it possible to overwhelm the LLM by exceeding or exploiting this limit, leading to resource exhaustion.
As an example, an attacker may continuously flood the LLM with sequential inputs that each reach the upper limit of the model’s context window. This high-volume, resource-intensive traffic overloads the system, resulting in slower response times and even denial of service. As another example, if an LLM-based chatbot is inundated with a flood of recursive or exceptionally long prompts, it can strain computational resources, causing system crashes or significant delays for other users.
How to prevent Model Denial of Service:
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limits to restrict the number of requests from a single user or IP address within a specific timeframe. This reduces the chance of overwhelming the system with excessive traffic.
- Resource Allocation Caps: Set caps on resource usage per request to ensure that complex or high-resource requests do not consume excessive CPU or memory. This helps prevent resource exhaustion.
- Input Size Restrictions: Limit input size according to the LLM's context window capacity to prevent excessive context expansion. For example, inputs exceeding a predefined character limit can be truncated or rejected.
- Monitoring and Alerts: Continuously monitor resource utilization and establish alerts for unusual spikes, which may indicate a DoS attempt. This allows for proactive threat detection and response.
- Developer Awareness and Training: Educate developers about DoS vulnerabilities in LLMs and establish guidelines for secure model deployment. Understanding these risks enables teams to implement preventative measures more effectively.
LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Supply Chain attacks are incredibly common and this is no different with LLMs, which, in this case refers to risks associated with the third-party components, training data, pre-trained models, and deployment platforms used within LLMs. These vulnerabilities can arise from outdated libraries, tampered models, and even compromised data sources, impacting the security and reliability of the entire application. Unlike traditional software supply chain risks, LLM supply chain vulnerabilities extend to the models and datasets themselves, which may be manipulated to include biases, backdoors, or malware that compromises system integrity.
As an example, an organization uses a third-party pre-trained model to conduct economic analysis. If this model is poisoned with incorrect or biased data, it could generate inaccurate results that mislead decision-making. Additionally, if the organization uses an outdated plugin or compromised library, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or tamper with sensitive information. Such vulnerabilities can result in significant security breaches, financial loss, or reputational damage.
How to prevent Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:
- Vet Third-Party Components: Carefully review the terms, privacy policies, and security measures of all third-party model providers, data sources, and plugins. Use only trusted suppliers and ensure they have robust security protocols in place.
- Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): An SBOM provides a complete inventory of all components, allowing for quick detection of vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes. Ensure that all components are up-to-date and apply patches as needed.
- Use Model and Code Signing: For models and external code, employ digital signatures to verify their integrity and authenticity before use. This helps ensure that no tampering has occurred.
- Anomaly Detection and Robustness Testing: Conduct adversarial robustness tests and anomaly detection on models and data to catch signs of tampering or data poisoning. Integrating these checks into your MLOps pipeline can enhance overall security.
- Implement Monitoring and Patching Policies: Regularly monitor component usage, scan for vulnerabilities, and patch outdated components. For sensitive applications, continuously audit your suppliers’ security posture and update components as new threats emerge.
LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure
Sensitive Information Disclosure in LLMs occurs when the model inadvertently reveals private, proprietary, or confidential information through its output. This can happen due to the model being trained on sensitive data or because it memorizes and later reproduces private information. Such disclosures can result in significant security breaches, including unauthorized access to personal data, intellectual property leaks, and violations of privacy laws.
As an example, there could be an LLM-based chatbot trained on a dataset containing personal information such as users’ full names, addresses, or proprietary business data. If the model memorizes this data, it could accidentally reveal this sensitive information to other users. For instance, a user might ask the chatbot for a recommendation, and the model could inadvertently respond with personal information it learned during training, violating privacy rules.
How to prevent Sensitive Information Disclosure:
- Data Sanitization: Before training, scrub datasets of personal or sensitive information. Use techniques like anonymization and redaction to ensure no sensitive data remains in the training data.
- Input and Output Filtering: Implement robust input validation and sanitization to prevent sensitive data from entering the model’s training data or being echoed back in outputs.
- Limit Training Data Exposure: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting sensitive data from being part of the training dataset. Fine-tune the model with only the data necessary for its task, and ensure high-privilege data is not accessible to lower-privilege users.
- User Awareness: Make users aware of how their data is processed by providing clear Terms of Use and offering opt-out options for having their data used in model training.
- Access Controls: Apply strict access control to external data sources used by the LLM, ensuring that sensitive information is handled securely throughout the system
LLM07: Insecure Plugin Design
Insecure Plugin Design vulnerabilities arise when LLM plugins, which extend the model’s capabilities, are not adequately secured. These plugins often allow free-text inputs and may lack proper input validation and access controls. When enabled, plugins can execute various tasks based on the LLM’s outputs without further checks, which can expose the system to risks like data exfiltration, remote code execution, and privilege escalation. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because plugins can operate with elevated permissions while assuming that user inputs are trustworthy.
As an example, there could be a weather plugin that allows users to input a base URL and query. An attacker could craft a malicious input that directs the LLM to a domain they control, allowing them to inject harmful content into the system. Similarly, a plugin that accepts SQL “WHERE” clauses without validation could enable an attacker to execute SQL injection attacks, gaining unauthorized access to data in a database.
How to prevent Insecure Plugin Design:
- Enforce Parameterized Input: Plugins should restrict inputs to specific parameters and avoid free-form text wherever possible. This can prevent injection attacks and other exploits.
- Input Validation and Sanitization: Plugins should include robust validation on all inputs. Using Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) can help identify vulnerabilities during development.
- Access Control: Follow the principle of least privilege, limiting each plugin's permissions to only what is necessary. Implement OAuth2 or API keys to control access and ensure only authorized users or components can trigger sensitive actions.
- Manual Authorization for Sensitive Actions: For actions that could impact user security, such as transferring files or accessing private repositories, require explicit user confirmation.
- Adhere to OWASP API Security Guidelines: Since plugins often function as REST APIs, apply best practices from the OWASP API Security Top 10. This includes securing endpoints and applying rate limiting to mitigate potential abuse.
LLM08: Excessive Agency
Excessive Agency in LLM-based applications arises when models are granted too much autonomy or functionality, allowing them to perform actions beyond their intended scope. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM agent has access to functions that are unnecessary for its purpose or operates with excessive permissions, such as being able to modify or delete records instead of only reading them. Unlike Insecure Output Handling, which deals with the lack of validation on the model’s outputs, Excessive Agency pertains to the risks involved when an LLM takes actions without proper authorization, potentially leading to confidentiality, integrity, and availability issues.
As an example, there could be an LLM-based assistant that is given access to a user's email account to summarize incoming messages. If the plugin that is used to read emails also has permissions to send messages, a malicious prompt injection could trick the LLM into sending unauthorized emails (or spam) from the user's account.
How to prevent Excessive Agency:
- Restrict Plugin Functionality: Ensure plugins and tools only provide necessary functions. For example, if a plugin is used to read emails, it should not include capabilities to delete or send emails.
- Limit Permissions: Follow the principle of least privilege by restricting plugins’ access to external systems. For instance, a plugin for database access should be read-only if writing or modifying data is not required.
- Avoid Open-Ended Functions: Avoid functions like “run shell command” or “fetch URL” that provide broad system access. Instead, use plugins that perform specific, controlled tasks.
- User Authorization and Scope Tracking: Require plugins to execute actions within the context of a specific user's permissions. For example, using OAuth with limited scopes helps ensure actions align with the user’s access level.
- Human-in-the-Loop Control: Require user confirmation for high-impact actions. For instance, a plugin that posts to social media should require the user to review and approve the content before it is published.
- Authorization in Downstream Systems: Implement authorization checks in downstream systems that validate each request against security policies. This prevents the LLM from making unauthorized changes directly.
LLM09: Overreliance
Overreliance occurs when users or systems trust the outputs of a LLM without proper oversight or verification. While LLMs can generate creative and informative content, they are prone to “hallucinations” (producing false or misleading information) or providing authoritative-sounding but incorrect outputs. Overreliance on these models can result in security risks, misinformation, miscommunication, and even legal issues, especially if LLM-generated content is used without validation. This vulnerability becomes especially dangerous in cases where LLMs suggest insecure coding practices or flawed recommendations.
As an example, there could be a development team using an LLM to expedite the coding process. The LLM suggests an insecure code library, and the team, trusting the LLM, incorporates it into their software without review. This introduces a serious vulnerability. As another example, a news organization might use an LLM to generate articles, but if they don’t validate the information, it could lead to the spread of disinformation.
How to prevent Overreliance:
- Regular Monitoring and Review: Implement processes to review LLM outputs regularly. Use techniques like self-consistency checks or voting mechanisms to compare multiple model responses and filter out inconsistencies.
- Cross-Verification: Compare the LLM’s output with reliable, trusted sources to ensure the information’s accuracy. This step is crucial, especially in fields where factual accuracy is imperative.
- Fine-Tuning and Prompt Engineering: Fine-tune models for specific tasks or domains to reduce hallucinations. Techniques like parameter-efficient tuning (PET) and chain-of-thought prompting can help improve the quality of LLM outputs.
- Automated Validation: Use automated validation tools to cross-check generated outputs against known facts or data, adding an extra layer of security.
- Risk Communication: Clearly communicate the limitations of LLMs to users, highlighting the potential for errors. Transparent disclaimers can help manage user expectations and encourage cautious use of LLM outputs.
- Secure Coding Practices: For development environments, establish guidelines to prevent the integration of potentially insecure code. Avoid relying solely on LLM-generated code without thorough review.
LLM10: Model Theft
Model Theft refers to the unauthorized access, extraction, or replication of proprietary LLMs by malicious actors. These models, containing valuable intellectual property, are at risk of exfiltration, which can lead to significant economic and reputational loss, erosion of competitive advantage, and unauthorized access to sensitive information encoded within the model. Attackers may steal models directly from company infrastructure or replicate them by querying APIs to build shadow models that mimic the original. As LLMs become more prevalent, safeguarding their confidentiality and integrity is crucial.
As an example, an attacker could exploit a misconfiguration in a company’s network security settings, gaining access to their LLM model repository. Once inside, the attacker could exfiltrate the proprietary model and use it to build a competing service. Alternatively, an insider may leak model artifacts, allowing adversaries to launch gray box adversarial attacks or fine-tune their own models with stolen data.
How to prevent Model Theft:
- Access Controls and Authentication: Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and enforce strong authentication mechanisms to limit unauthorized access to LLM repositories and training environments. Adhere to the principle of least privilege for all user accounts.
- Supplier and Dependency Management: Monitor and verify the security of suppliers and dependencies to reduce the risk of supply chain attacks, ensuring that third-party components are secure.
- Centralized Model Inventory: Maintain a central ML Model Registry with access controls, logging, and authentication for all production models. This can aid in governance, compliance, and prompt detection of unauthorized activities.
- Network Restrictions: Limit LLM access to internal services, APIs, and network resources. This reduces the attack surface for side-channel attacks or unauthorized model access.
- Continuous Monitoring and Logging: Regularly monitor access logs for unusual activity and promptly address any unauthorized access. Automated governance workflows can also help streamline access and deployment controls.
- Adversarial Robustness: Implement adversarial robustness training to help detect extraction queries and defend against side-channel attacks. Rate-limit API calls to further protect against data exfiltration.
- Watermarking Techniques: Embed unique watermarks within the model to track unauthorized copies or detect theft during the model’s lifecycle.
Wrapping it all up
As LLMs continue to grow in capability and integration across industries, their security risks must be managed with the same vigilance as any other critical system. From Prompt Injection to Model Theft, the vulnerabilities outlined in the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs highlight the unique challenges posed by these models, particularly when they are granted excessive agency or have access to sensitive data. Addressing these risks requires a multifaceted approach involving strict access controls, robust validation processes, continuous monitoring, and proactive governance.
For technical leadership, this means ensuring that development and operational teams implement best practices across the LLM lifecycle starting from securing training data to ensuring safe interaction between LLMs and external systems through plugins and APIs. Prioritizing security frameworks such as the OWASP ASVS, adopting MLOps best practices, and maintaining vigilance over supply chains and insider threats are key steps to safeguarding LLM deployments. Ultimately, strong leadership that emphasizes security-first practices will protect both intellectual property and organizational integrity, while fostering trust in the use of AI technologies.