TL;DR
- Federal pullback is real: CISA faces a proposed $495M cut and ~1,000 roles; MS-ISAC lost $10M; sector agencies trimmed; CIPAC dissolved.
- Expect less intel sharing and coordination, more fragmentation of standards, and slower joint response.
- Highest risk: critical infrastructure and small public orgs (schools, municipalities) that relied on federal support.
- Private sector must go self-reliant: build internal detection/response, harden identity, segment networks, and formalize incident playbooks.
- Double down on supply-chain security and third-party risk; assume attackers will pivot through weaker partners.
- Measure resilience, not box-checking: time-to-detect, time-to-contain, report rates, and tabletop outcomes.
- Near-term moves: join private ISAC/ISAO equivalents, run executive wire-fraud drills, tighten backups/MFA, upskill teams with targeted training
The cybersecurity landscape is undergoing a drastic change.
Long a stalwart partner in security initiatives, as well as a valuable source of threat monitoring and intelligence, the federal government is currently in the midst of a significant reduction in its cyber responsibilities. These cuts are taking place at every level:
- In its proposed budget for FY 2026, CISA will lose $495 million and eliminate roughly 1,000 positions — about one-third of its entire workforce.
- Last year, $10 million was cut from the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), a critical information sharing program many states relied on.
- Multiple cuts have taken place or are being planned across sector-specific agencies, such as the unit that handles healthcare security at the Department of Health and Human Services.
This loss of federal cybersecurity support marks a dramatic shift that is already reverberating across public-sector entities in state and local governments. But in the private sector, many cybersecurity organizations have yet to feel the effects. In fact, a good amount may not even be aware of the extent of the government’s pull back from its previous cybersecurity efforts.
But this won’t likely last for long. The fallback from these cuts will soon be felt throughout the industry. What’s more, the shift that will happen may even spell a new age for how we think of cybersecurity. Here’s what this means.
How the cybersecurity landscape has changed
The origins of federal cyber initiatives can be traced as far back as the founding of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1972. Called the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) at the time, NIST came to define cybersecurity guidance for both public and private groups for decades. It also began what eventually became a robust collaborative relationship between the government and private industry to develop more effective defenses against a range of threats. This relationship involved hundreds of millions of dollars in shared investments, constant and bidirectional information sharing, and the development of technology, such as public-key cryptography, that is now used across industries.
As the need for cybersecurity has grown in the past decade, so has the government’s involvement. Recent achievements include the Small Business Cybersecurity Act, the Cybersecurity Framework, and the formation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in 2018. Despite its relative youth, CISA has played a particularly influential role in cybersecurity. Its notable accomplishments include the strengthening of federal government standards and networks following the SolarWinds attack in 2021, the establishment of the Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF) and the Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) programs, and strategic coordination between public and private partners in order to protect critical infrastructure.
However, the recent cuts in federal cybersecurity funding are not only reducing its footprint, but entirely rearranging the public-private cybersecurity relationship. For instance, the proposed $495 million removal of funds from CISA’s budget would largely fall on programs that help outside organizations, such as its Stakeholder Engagement Division and National Risk Management Center. Moreover, the elimination of the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) in March 2025 sharply curtails the open sharing of important cyber intel. This has put a pause on a number of joint government-industry projects, such as research into AI-powered threat intelligence.
But even more significant may be the resulting loss of trust that these cuts engender. With funding suddenly pulled and previous legal safeguards preventing the disclosure of shared information now in flux, companies will likely be much less willing to share valuable information. This breakdown spells a potential cultural shift away from a collective mindset of cybersecurity protection and into one that instead encourages each company and organization to operate independently.
The impact to the nation, businesses, and industries
Now that these cuts are underway, where can we expect to see their impact most significantly? Let’s consider some of the most prominent potential effects across both public and private entities.
1. There will be downstream consequences to reduced intelligence sharing
With less information flowing from the government to businesses and vice versa, the ability of both public and private organizations to plan and prepare for major threats will become more limited. “Previously, from a security perspective, the view was that our nation’s businesses and core infrastructure were treated as one,” said Chris Murphy, SVP of Sales at Cybrary. “But the recent budget cuts will cause that mission to shrink.”
What will be the result? One consequence will be a lack of continued support for many of the common tools and guidance that businesses rely on, such as the NICE framework. In turn, this will lead to increased fragmentation as organizations begin following their own sets of preferred rules and regulations. “Private companies are going to take over,” said Jeremy Gehring, Cybrary’s CEO. “They’ll decide which rules they like better, regardless of what other companies are doing.”
As private companies limit the intelligence they share, the government will also be at a disadvantage when it comes to identifying and helping to mitigate large-scale threats. Just as private businesses won’t have as much guidance from the government, the state will have a much reduced understanding of what various industries need. The effects of this may make both private companies and the U.S. government more attractive targets to potential cyberattacks.
2. Critical infrastructure will face an increased risk of threats
Worth a particular mention are the vulnerabilities that federal cuts to cybersecurity will create across agencies and organizations in charge of essential services. These entities — whether they run hospital and healthcare services, public utilities like water or energy, or local municipalities — typically must rely on outside support for their cybersecurity needs, despite their obvious appeal as targets. Nevertheless, the federal cybersecurity cuts have already started to be felt by these groups as key cyber liaison positions are left vacant and cyber coordination meetings are canceled.
“It’s really unsettling to think about,” said Nick Misner, Cybrary’s COO. “In theory, you could have a private threat actor group locking down a water system or some other public utility. Without the right support in place, we could be leaving open backdoors for malware to get into our critical infrastructure. It will be far more likely to happen.”
While we’re fortunate that this hasn’t resulted in a major nationwide crisis yet, there is no shortage of recent examples that highlight this threat. In February, a “sophisticated cyberattack” shut down the computer systems of the Virginia Attorney General, while in December of 2024, hackers installed ransomware in Rhode Island’s state computer systems. As a result, many critical infrastructure leaders across government and private organizations are becoming worried about the increased possibility of attacks. But, like businesses, they can no longer rely on a coordinated effort and are instead looking to go it alone.
3. Small public organizations will be hit the hardest
Alongside critical infrastructure, smaller public organizations that largely lack their own cyber defense capabilities will be left to fend for themselves. For instance, although the public school system handles a trove of sensitive student information, it has relied on support from the federal government (in the form of funding and expert guidance) to detect and prevent malware, defend against ransomware attacks, and use other tools to bolster their cyber security. However, with millions now cut from the MS-ISAC budget, these resources are now in jeopardy.
State, local, tribal, and territorial governments all find themselves in the same predicament. But unlike larger organizations, they don’t have alternative plans to fall back on. “They don’t have the money for cyber defense technologies,” said Murphy. “And in many cases, they are very distributed, which just adds to the challenge. There are around 1,200 school districts in Texas alone, and only a small percentage of them get dedicated cyber support. The rest are on their own. Many of them don’t even have email security.”
And while many businesses may not think of this as a direct threat to their security, the fact is that any vulnerability anywhere can increase your risk. “For many threat actors, the best thing you can do is infiltrate a small organization, then wait,” said Murphy. “Once they get a contract with another company, it’ll be possible to move up the supply chain and get into more critical infrastructure as they move laterally. So there are definitely implications, but they may look different than you would think.”
Businesses must prepare for this new era
As the consequences of these cuts continue to roll out, it is becoming ever more apparent just how much cybersecurity practices within the US are set to change. Rather than the collaboration and open sharing that marked the past decade, this new era will be characterized by an increasing need to be self-reliant and focused on their own needs. This means there will be a need for more investments in in-house security and staffing, a more concerted push toward comprehensive upskilling and training, and thorough contingency planning in case of attacks.
That said, many businesses out there have yet to start adapting to these changes. Perhaps they’re waiting to see where the chips fall, or maybe it’s still too early for them to feel the impact these cuts will have on them. But among experts across industries, both private and public, there is an increasing consensus that even if organizations aren’t readying themselves for this era, the threat actors are.
“The bad guys may already be in your system,” said Misner. “You might not know it yet, but they may be in there already. And they’re waiting.”
Ready to start preparing your organization for this new era of cybersecurity? Cybrary can help you stay ahead. Learn about the most critical security risks your web applications face in our OWASP Top 10 course, work through realistic attack scenarios in our Threat Actor Campaigns collection, or get hands-on training for the latest vulnerabilities and exploits in our CVE Series.
The Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) is a community-led organization and has been around for over 20 years and is largely known for its Top 10 web application security risks (check out our course on it). As the use of generative AI and large language models (LLMs) has exploded recently, so too has the risk to privacy and security by these technologies. OWASP, leading the charge for security, has come out with its Top 10 for LLMs and Generative AI Apps this year. In this blog post we’ll explore the Top 10 risks and explore examples of each as well as how to prevent these risks.
LLM01: Prompt Injection
Those familiar with the OWASP Top 10 for web applications have seen the injection category before at the top of the list for many years. This is no exception with LLMs and ranks as number one. Prompt Injection can be a critical vulnerability in LLMs where an attacker manipulates the model through crafted inputs, leading it to execute unintended actions. This can result in unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or social engineering. There are two types: Direct Prompt Injection, which involves "jailbreaking" the system by altering or revealing underlying system prompts, giving an attacker access to backend systems or sensitive data, and Indirect Prompt Injection, where external inputs (like files or web content) are used to manipulate the LLM's behavior.
As an example, an attacker might upload a resume containing an indirect prompt injection, instructing an LLM-based hiring tool to favorably evaluate the resume. When an internal user runs the document through the LLM for summarization, the embedded prompt makes the LLM respond positively about the candidate’s suitability, regardless of the actual content.
How to prevent prompt injection:
- Limit LLM Access: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting the LLM's access to sensitive backend systems and enforcing API token controls for extended functionalities like plugins.
- Human Approval for Critical Actions: For high-risk operations, require human validation before executing, ensuring that the LLM's suggestions are not followed blindly.
- Separate External and User Content: Use frameworks like ChatML for OpenAI API calls to clearly differentiate between user prompts and untrusted external content, reducing the chance of unintentional action from mixed inputs.
- Monitor and Flag Untrusted Outputs: Regularly review LLM outputs and mark suspicious content, helping users to recognize potentially unreliable information.
LLM02: Insecure Output Handling
Insecure Output Handling occurs when the outputs generated by a LLM are not properly validated or sanitized before being used by other components in a system. Since LLMs can generate various types of content based on input prompts, failing to handle these outputs securely can introduce risks like cross-site scripting (XSS), server-side request forgery (SSRF), or even remote code execution (RCE). Unlike Overreliance (LLM09), which focuses on the accuracy of LLM outputs, Insecure Output Handling specifically addresses vulnerabilities in how these outputs are processed downstream.
As an example, there could be a web application that uses an LLM to summarize user-provided content and renders it back in a webpage. An attacker submits a prompt containing malicious JavaScript code. If the LLM’s output is displayed on the webpage without proper sanitization, the JavaScript will execute in the user’s browser, leading to XSS. Alternatively, if the LLM’s output is sent to a backend database or shell command, it could allow SQL injection or remote code execution if not properly validated.
How to prevent Insecure Output Handling:
- Zero-Trust Approach: Treat the LLM as an untrusted source, applying strict allow list validation and sanitization to all outputs it generates, especially before passing them to downstream systems or functions.
- Output Encoding: Encode LLM outputs before displaying them to end users, particularly when dealing with web content where XSS risks are prevalent.
- Adhere to Security Standards: Follow the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) guidelines, which provide strategies for input validation and sanitization to protect against code injection risks.
LLM03: Training Data Poisoning
Training Data Poisoning refers to the manipulation of the data used to train LLMs, introducing biases, backdoors, or vulnerabilities. This tampered data can degrade the model's effectiveness, introduce harmful biases, or create security flaws that malicious actors can exploit. Poisoned data could lead to inaccurate or inappropriate outputs, compromising user trust, harming brand reputation, and increasing security risks like downstream exploitation.
As an example, there could be a scenario where an LLM is trained on a dataset that has been tampered with by a malicious actor. The poisoned dataset includes subtly manipulated content, such as biased news articles or fabricated facts. When the model is deployed, it may output biased information or incorrect details based on the poisoned data. This not only degrades the model’s performance but can also mislead users, potentially harming the model’s credibility and the organization’s reputation.
How to prevent Training Data Poisoning:
- Data Validation and Vetting: Verify the sources of training data, especially when sourcing from third-party datasets. Conduct thorough checks on data integrity, and where possible, use trusted data sources.
- Machine Learning Bill of Materials (ML-BOM): Maintain an ML-BOM to track the provenance of training data and ensure that each source is legitimate and suitable for the model’s purpose.
- Sandboxing and Network Controls: Restrict access to external data sources and use network controls to prevent unintended data scraping during training. This helps ensure that only vetted data is used for training.
- Adversarial Robustness Techniques: Implement strategies like federated learning and statistical outlier detection to reduce the impact of poisoned data. Periodic testing and monitoring can identify unusual model behaviors that may indicate a poisoning attempt.
- Human Review and Auditing: Regularly audit model outputs and use a human-in-the-loop approach to validate outputs, especially for sensitive applications. This added layer of scrutiny can catch potential issues early.
LLM04: Model Denial of Service
Model Denial of Service (DoS) is a vulnerability in which an attacker deliberately consumes an excessive amount of computational resources by interacting with a LLM. This can result in degraded service quality, increased costs, or even system crashes. One emerging concern is manipulating the context window of the LLM, which refers to the maximum amount of text the model can process at once. This makes it possible to overwhelm the LLM by exceeding or exploiting this limit, leading to resource exhaustion.
As an example, an attacker may continuously flood the LLM with sequential inputs that each reach the upper limit of the model’s context window. This high-volume, resource-intensive traffic overloads the system, resulting in slower response times and even denial of service. As another example, if an LLM-based chatbot is inundated with a flood of recursive or exceptionally long prompts, it can strain computational resources, causing system crashes or significant delays for other users.
How to prevent Model Denial of Service:
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limits to restrict the number of requests from a single user or IP address within a specific timeframe. This reduces the chance of overwhelming the system with excessive traffic.
- Resource Allocation Caps: Set caps on resource usage per request to ensure that complex or high-resource requests do not consume excessive CPU or memory. This helps prevent resource exhaustion.
- Input Size Restrictions: Limit input size according to the LLM's context window capacity to prevent excessive context expansion. For example, inputs exceeding a predefined character limit can be truncated or rejected.
- Monitoring and Alerts: Continuously monitor resource utilization and establish alerts for unusual spikes, which may indicate a DoS attempt. This allows for proactive threat detection and response.
- Developer Awareness and Training: Educate developers about DoS vulnerabilities in LLMs and establish guidelines for secure model deployment. Understanding these risks enables teams to implement preventative measures more effectively.
LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Supply Chain attacks are incredibly common and this is no different with LLMs, which, in this case refers to risks associated with the third-party components, training data, pre-trained models, and deployment platforms used within LLMs. These vulnerabilities can arise from outdated libraries, tampered models, and even compromised data sources, impacting the security and reliability of the entire application. Unlike traditional software supply chain risks, LLM supply chain vulnerabilities extend to the models and datasets themselves, which may be manipulated to include biases, backdoors, or malware that compromises system integrity.
As an example, an organization uses a third-party pre-trained model to conduct economic analysis. If this model is poisoned with incorrect or biased data, it could generate inaccurate results that mislead decision-making. Additionally, if the organization uses an outdated plugin or compromised library, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or tamper with sensitive information. Such vulnerabilities can result in significant security breaches, financial loss, or reputational damage.
How to prevent Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:
- Vet Third-Party Components: Carefully review the terms, privacy policies, and security measures of all third-party model providers, data sources, and plugins. Use only trusted suppliers and ensure they have robust security protocols in place.
- Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): An SBOM provides a complete inventory of all components, allowing for quick detection of vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes. Ensure that all components are up-to-date and apply patches as needed.
- Use Model and Code Signing: For models and external code, employ digital signatures to verify their integrity and authenticity before use. This helps ensure that no tampering has occurred.
- Anomaly Detection and Robustness Testing: Conduct adversarial robustness tests and anomaly detection on models and data to catch signs of tampering or data poisoning. Integrating these checks into your MLOps pipeline can enhance overall security.
- Implement Monitoring and Patching Policies: Regularly monitor component usage, scan for vulnerabilities, and patch outdated components. For sensitive applications, continuously audit your suppliers’ security posture and update components as new threats emerge.
LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure
Sensitive Information Disclosure in LLMs occurs when the model inadvertently reveals private, proprietary, or confidential information through its output. This can happen due to the model being trained on sensitive data or because it memorizes and later reproduces private information. Such disclosures can result in significant security breaches, including unauthorized access to personal data, intellectual property leaks, and violations of privacy laws.
As an example, there could be an LLM-based chatbot trained on a dataset containing personal information such as users’ full names, addresses, or proprietary business data. If the model memorizes this data, it could accidentally reveal this sensitive information to other users. For instance, a user might ask the chatbot for a recommendation, and the model could inadvertently respond with personal information it learned during training, violating privacy rules.
How to prevent Sensitive Information Disclosure:
- Data Sanitization: Before training, scrub datasets of personal or sensitive information. Use techniques like anonymization and redaction to ensure no sensitive data remains in the training data.
- Input and Output Filtering: Implement robust input validation and sanitization to prevent sensitive data from entering the model’s training data or being echoed back in outputs.
- Limit Training Data Exposure: Apply the principle of least privilege by restricting sensitive data from being part of the training dataset. Fine-tune the model with only the data necessary for its task, and ensure high-privilege data is not accessible to lower-privilege users.
- User Awareness: Make users aware of how their data is processed by providing clear Terms of Use and offering opt-out options for having their data used in model training.
- Access Controls: Apply strict access control to external data sources used by the LLM, ensuring that sensitive information is handled securely throughout the system
LLM07: Insecure Plugin Design
Insecure Plugin Design vulnerabilities arise when LLM plugins, which extend the model’s capabilities, are not adequately secured. These plugins often allow free-text inputs and may lack proper input validation and access controls. When enabled, plugins can execute various tasks based on the LLM’s outputs without further checks, which can expose the system to risks like data exfiltration, remote code execution, and privilege escalation. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because plugins can operate with elevated permissions while assuming that user inputs are trustworthy.
As an example, there could be a weather plugin that allows users to input a base URL and query. An attacker could craft a malicious input that directs the LLM to a domain they control, allowing them to inject harmful content into the system. Similarly, a plugin that accepts SQL “WHERE” clauses without validation could enable an attacker to execute SQL injection attacks, gaining unauthorized access to data in a database.
How to prevent Insecure Plugin Design:
- Enforce Parameterized Input: Plugins should restrict inputs to specific parameters and avoid free-form text wherever possible. This can prevent injection attacks and other exploits.
- Input Validation and Sanitization: Plugins should include robust validation on all inputs. Using Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) can help identify vulnerabilities during development.
- Access Control: Follow the principle of least privilege, limiting each plugin's permissions to only what is necessary. Implement OAuth2 or API keys to control access and ensure only authorized users or components can trigger sensitive actions.
- Manual Authorization for Sensitive Actions: For actions that could impact user security, such as transferring files or accessing private repositories, require explicit user confirmation.
- Adhere to OWASP API Security Guidelines: Since plugins often function as REST APIs, apply best practices from the OWASP API Security Top 10. This includes securing endpoints and applying rate limiting to mitigate potential abuse.
LLM08: Excessive Agency
Excessive Agency in LLM-based applications arises when models are granted too much autonomy or functionality, allowing them to perform actions beyond their intended scope. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM agent has access to functions that are unnecessary for its purpose or operates with excessive permissions, such as being able to modify or delete records instead of only reading them. Unlike Insecure Output Handling, which deals with the lack of validation on the model’s outputs, Excessive Agency pertains to the risks involved when an LLM takes actions without proper authorization, potentially leading to confidentiality, integrity, and availability issues.
As an example, there could be an LLM-based assistant that is given access to a user's email account to summarize incoming messages. If the plugin that is used to read emails also has permissions to send messages, a malicious prompt injection could trick the LLM into sending unauthorized emails (or spam) from the user's account.
How to prevent Excessive Agency:
- Restrict Plugin Functionality: Ensure plugins and tools only provide necessary functions. For example, if a plugin is used to read emails, it should not include capabilities to delete or send emails.
- Limit Permissions: Follow the principle of least privilege by restricting plugins’ access to external systems. For instance, a plugin for database access should be read-only if writing or modifying data is not required.
- Avoid Open-Ended Functions: Avoid functions like “run shell command” or “fetch URL” that provide broad system access. Instead, use plugins that perform specific, controlled tasks.
- User Authorization and Scope Tracking: Require plugins to execute actions within the context of a specific user's permissions. For example, using OAuth with limited scopes helps ensure actions align with the user’s access level.
- Human-in-the-Loop Control: Require user confirmation for high-impact actions. For instance, a plugin that posts to social media should require the user to review and approve the content before it is published.
- Authorization in Downstream Systems: Implement authorization checks in downstream systems that validate each request against security policies. This prevents the LLM from making unauthorized changes directly.
LLM09: Overreliance
Overreliance occurs when users or systems trust the outputs of a LLM without proper oversight or verification. While LLMs can generate creative and informative content, they are prone to “hallucinations” (producing false or misleading information) or providing authoritative-sounding but incorrect outputs. Overreliance on these models can result in security risks, misinformation, miscommunication, and even legal issues, especially if LLM-generated content is used without validation. This vulnerability becomes especially dangerous in cases where LLMs suggest insecure coding practices or flawed recommendations.
As an example, there could be a development team using an LLM to expedite the coding process. The LLM suggests an insecure code library, and the team, trusting the LLM, incorporates it into their software without review. This introduces a serious vulnerability. As another example, a news organization might use an LLM to generate articles, but if they don’t validate the information, it could lead to the spread of disinformation.
How to prevent Overreliance:
- Regular Monitoring and Review: Implement processes to review LLM outputs regularly. Use techniques like self-consistency checks or voting mechanisms to compare multiple model responses and filter out inconsistencies.
- Cross-Verification: Compare the LLM’s output with reliable, trusted sources to ensure the information’s accuracy. This step is crucial, especially in fields where factual accuracy is imperative.
- Fine-Tuning and Prompt Engineering: Fine-tune models for specific tasks or domains to reduce hallucinations. Techniques like parameter-efficient tuning (PET) and chain-of-thought prompting can help improve the quality of LLM outputs.
- Automated Validation: Use automated validation tools to cross-check generated outputs against known facts or data, adding an extra layer of security.
- Risk Communication: Clearly communicate the limitations of LLMs to users, highlighting the potential for errors. Transparent disclaimers can help manage user expectations and encourage cautious use of LLM outputs.
- Secure Coding Practices: For development environments, establish guidelines to prevent the integration of potentially insecure code. Avoid relying solely on LLM-generated code without thorough review.
LLM10: Model Theft
Model Theft refers to the unauthorized access, extraction, or replication of proprietary LLMs by malicious actors. These models, containing valuable intellectual property, are at risk of exfiltration, which can lead to significant economic and reputational loss, erosion of competitive advantage, and unauthorized access to sensitive information encoded within the model. Attackers may steal models directly from company infrastructure or replicate them by querying APIs to build shadow models that mimic the original. As LLMs become more prevalent, safeguarding their confidentiality and integrity is crucial.
As an example, an attacker could exploit a misconfiguration in a company’s network security settings, gaining access to their LLM model repository. Once inside, the attacker could exfiltrate the proprietary model and use it to build a competing service. Alternatively, an insider may leak model artifacts, allowing adversaries to launch gray box adversarial attacks or fine-tune their own models with stolen data.
How to prevent Model Theft:
- Access Controls and Authentication: Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and enforce strong authentication mechanisms to limit unauthorized access to LLM repositories and training environments. Adhere to the principle of least privilege for all user accounts.
- Supplier and Dependency Management: Monitor and verify the security of suppliers and dependencies to reduce the risk of supply chain attacks, ensuring that third-party components are secure.
- Centralized Model Inventory: Maintain a central ML Model Registry with access controls, logging, and authentication for all production models. This can aid in governance, compliance, and prompt detection of unauthorized activities.
- Network Restrictions: Limit LLM access to internal services, APIs, and network resources. This reduces the attack surface for side-channel attacks or unauthorized model access.
- Continuous Monitoring and Logging: Regularly monitor access logs for unusual activity and promptly address any unauthorized access. Automated governance workflows can also help streamline access and deployment controls.
- Adversarial Robustness: Implement adversarial robustness training to help detect extraction queries and defend against side-channel attacks. Rate-limit API calls to further protect against data exfiltration.
- Watermarking Techniques: Embed unique watermarks within the model to track unauthorized copies or detect theft during the model’s lifecycle.
Wrapping it all up
As LLMs continue to grow in capability and integration across industries, their security risks must be managed with the same vigilance as any other critical system. From Prompt Injection to Model Theft, the vulnerabilities outlined in the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs highlight the unique challenges posed by these models, particularly when they are granted excessive agency or have access to sensitive data. Addressing these risks requires a multifaceted approach involving strict access controls, robust validation processes, continuous monitoring, and proactive governance.
For technical leadership, this means ensuring that development and operational teams implement best practices across the LLM lifecycle starting from securing training data to ensuring safe interaction between LLMs and external systems through plugins and APIs. Prioritizing security frameworks such as the OWASP ASVS, adopting MLOps best practices, and maintaining vigilance over supply chains and insider threats are key steps to safeguarding LLM deployments. Ultimately, strong leadership that emphasizes security-first practices will protect both intellectual property and organizational integrity, while fostering trust in the use of AI technologies.






